The impact of shareholder activism on financial reporting and compensation: The case of employee stock options expensing

Accounting Review

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 433-466

  Ferri, Fabrizio ^a   Sandino, Tatiana ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Financial reporting; Shareholder activism; Stock option expensing

Indexed keywords

EID: 65249184404     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.433     Document Type: Conference Paper

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