What matters in corporate governance

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 783-827

  Bebchuk, Lucian ^a,c   Cohen, Alma ^b,c   Ferrell, Allen ^c  

^a NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59449102162     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhn099     Document Type: Article

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