The political economy of the united nations security council: Money and influence

The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence

Volumn 9780521518413, Issue , 2012, Pages 1-291

  Vreeland, James Raymond ^a   Dreher, Axel ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923132125     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139027755     Document Type: Book

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