The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 105, Issue , 2013, Pages 211-225

  Kilby, Christopher ^a  

^a VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Donor influence; Project preparation; Stochastic frontier analysis; UN voting; United States; World Bank

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STOCHASTICITY; WORLD BANK;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84883756929     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.07.011     Document Type: Article

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