Political system transparency and monetary commitment regimes

International Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2002, Pages

  Lawrence Broz, J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 18744362431     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760403801     Document Type: Review

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