The international monetary fund in the global economy: Banks, bonds, and bailouts

The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-375

  Copelovitch, Mark S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924680909     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511712029     Document Type: Book

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