Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy

Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-256

  Stone, Randall W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84925136201     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511793943     Document Type: Book

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