Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-18

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b   Sturm, Jan Egbert ^a,b   Vreeland, James Raymond ^b,c  

^a KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^b CESifo ^*  (Germany)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Aid; UN Security Council; Voting; World Bank

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPMENT AID; UNITED NATIONS; VOTING BEHAVIOR; WORLD BANK;

EID: 53849105468     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.02.003     Document Type: Article

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