Foreign aid and global governance: Buying Bretton Woods - the Swiss-bloc case

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 369-391

  Vreeland, James Raymond ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Central Asia; Foreign aid; Global governance; IMF; Switzerland; World Bank

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052064063     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9111-z     Document Type: Article

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