Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?: The role of bureaucratic interest and public pressure

Public Choice

Volumn 122, Issue 1-2, 2005, Pages 159-175

  Hefeker, Carsten ^a   Michaelowa, Katharina ^a  

^a Hamburgisches Welt Wirtschafts Archiv   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23744480585     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-5791-3     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Alesina, A. and Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth 5: 33-64.
2. Azam, J.-P. and Laffont, J.-J. (2003). Contracting for aid. Journal of Development Economics 70: 25-58.
3. Boone, P. (1996). Politics and the effectiveness of aid. European Economic Review 40: 289-329.
4. Boughton, J. and Mourmouras, A. (2002). Is policy ownership an operational concept? IMF working paper 02/72.
5. Burnside, C. and Dollar, D.(2000). Aid, policies and growth. American Economic Review 90: 847-868.
6. Dixit, A. (2000). IMF programs as incentive mechanisms. Unpublished manuscript.
7. Drazen, A. (2000). Political economy in macroeconomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Drazen, A. (2001). Conditionality and ownership in IMF lending: A political economy approach. Unpublished manuscript.
9. Easterly, W. (2003). The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid. Journal of Policy Reform, forthcoming.
10. Foster, M., Healey, J., Martin, M. and White, H. (1999). Linking HIPC II debt relief with poverty reduction and wider aid issues: Some reflections and suggestions. Unpublished manuscript.
11. Lahiri, S. and Raimondos-Møller, P. (2000). Lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation. Economic Journal 110: 62-79.
12. Marshall, A. and Woodroffe, J. (2001). Policies to roll-back the state and privatize? Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers investigated. Unpublished manuscript.
13. Martens, B., Mummert, U., Murrell, P. and Seabright, P. (2002). The institutional economics of foreign aid. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14. Mayer, W. and Mourmouras, A. (2002). Vested interests in a positive theory of IFI conditionally. IMF working paper 02/73.
15. Michaelowa, K. (2003). The political economy of the enhanced HIPC-initiative. Public Choice 114:461-476.
16. Mosley, P. (1996). The failure of aid and adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Counter-examples and policy proposals. Journal of African Economies 5: 406-443.
17. Niskanen (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago: Aldine.
18. Svensson, J. (2000a). Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics 51: 437-461.
19. Svensson, J. (2000b). When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality. Journal of Development Economics 61: 61-84.
20. Svensson, J. (2003). Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? Journal of Development Economics 70: 381-402.
21. Vaubel, R. (1991). The political economy of the International Monetary Fund: A public choice analysis. In R. Vaubel and T. Willet (eds), The political economy of international organizations, 204-244. Boulder: Westview Press.
22. World Bank (1998). Assessing aid, Washington, D.C.