International security institutions, domestic politics, and institutional legitimacy

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 134-166

  Chapman, Terrence L ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic politics; Information transmission; International institutions; Legitimacy

Indexed keywords

EID: 33847156455     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002706296177     Document Type: Review

References (72)

1. Abbott, Kenneth W. 1993. "Trust but verify": The production of information in arms control treaties and other international agreements. Cornell International Law Journal 26: 1-58.
2. Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1). 3-32.
3. Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. International Organization 53 (4). 699-732.
4. Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review 89 (1). 61-73.
5. Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace ? World Politics 57 (1). 1-38.
6. Brody, Richard. 1991. Assessing the president. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
7. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review 89 (4). 841-853.
8. Bush, George H. W., and Brent Scowcroft. 1998. A world transformed. New York: Vintage.
9. Calvert, Randall. 1985. The value of biased information: A rational choice model of political advice. Journal of Politics 47: 530-555.
10. Carrubba, Clifford J. 2005. Courts and compliance in international regulatory regimes. Journal of Politics (Summer).
11. Chapman, Terrence, and Dan Reiter. 2004. The United Nations Security Council and the rally 'round the flag effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (6). 886-909.
12. Claude, Inis L. 1966. Collective legitimation as a political function of the UN. International Organization 20 (3). 367-379.
13. Dai, Xinyuan. 2002. Information systems in treaty regimes. World Politics 54: 405-436.
14. Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. International Organization 59 (Spring). 363-398.
15. Dixon, William. 1993. Democracy and the management of international conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (1). 42-68.
16. Doyle, Michael. 1986. Liberalism and world politics. American Political Science Review 80: 1151-1161.
17. Drezner, Dan. 2000. Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral economic sanctions: When is cooperation counterproductive ? International Organization 54 (4). 73-102.
18. Drezner, Daniel W., ed. 2003. Locating the proper authorities: The interaction of domestic and international institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
19. Eichenberg, Richard. 2005. Victory has many friends: U.S. public opinion and the use of military force, 1981-2005. International Security 30 (1). 140-177.
20. Fang, Songying. 2005. The informational role of international institutions and domestic politics. Unpublished manuscript. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
21. Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons. 1989. Cheap talk with two audiences. American Economic Review 79 (5). 1214-1223.
22. Fearon, James D. 1994. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3). 577-592.
23. Fey, Mark, and Kristopher W. Ramsey. 2006. The common priors assumption: A comment on "Bargaining and the nature of war." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4). 607-613.
24. Franck, Thomas. 1990. The power of legitimacy among nations. New York: Oxford University Press.
25. Gartner, Scott, and Gary Segura. 1998. War, casualties and public opinion. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (3). 278-300.
26. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1988. Asymmetric information and legislative rules with a heterogeneous committee. American Journal of Political Science 33 (2). 459-490.
27. Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature. American Journal of Political Science 34 (2). 531-564.
28. Glennon, Michael. 2003. Why the Security Council failed. Foreign Affairs 82 (3). 16-35.
29. Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review 99 (1). 29-44.
30. Grieco, Joseph M. 2004. Let's get a second opinion: Allies, the UN, and U.S. public support for war. Unpublished manuscript. Durham, NC: Duke University.
31. Halberstam, David. 2001. War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the generals. New York: Simon & Schuster.
32. Hurd, Ian. 1999. Legitimacy and authority in international politics. International Organization 53 (2). 397-408.
33. Hurd, Ian. 2002. Legitimacy, power, and the symbolic life of the UN Security Council. Global Governance 8: 35-51.
34. Hurd, Ian. 2005. The strategic use of liberal internationalism: Libya and the UN sanctions 1992-2003. International Organization 59 (3). 495-525.
35. Jentelson, Bruce. 1992. The pretty prudent public: Post post-Vietnam American opinion on the use of military force. International Studies Quarterly 36 ( March ).
36. Jentelson, Bruce, and Rebecca Britton. 1998. Still pretty prudent: Post-cold war American public opinion on the use of military force. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 ( August ).
37. Keohane, Robert. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. International Organization 55 (4). 761-800.
39. Kull, Steven, and I. M. Destler. 1999. Misreading the public: The myth of a new isolationism. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
40. Kydd, Andrew. 2003. Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. American Journal of Political Science 47 (4). 597-611.
41. Lian, Bradley, James Joyner, and John R. Oneal. 1996. Are the American people "pretty prudent"? Public responses to U.S. uses of force, 1950-1988. International Studies Quarterly 40: 261-279.
42. Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn what they need to know ? New York: Cambridge University Press.
43. Malone, David M. 1998. Decision-making in the UN Security Council: The case of Haiti, 1990-1997. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.
44. Malone, David M., ed. 2004. The UN Security Council: From the cold war to the 21st century. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
45. Malone, David, and Yuen Foong Khong. 2003. Resisting the unilateral impulse. In Unilateralism and U.S. foreign policy: International Perspectives, edited by David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong: Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
46. Mansfield, Edward, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why democracies cooperate more: Electoral control and international trade agreements. International Organization 56 (3). 297-337.
47. Marfleet, B. Gregory, and Colleen Miller. 2005. Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the Security Council. Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (3). 249-384.
48. Martin, Lisa. 1992. Coercive cooperation: Explaining multilateral economic sanctions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
49. Martin, Lisa, and Beth Simmons. 1998. Theories and empirical studies of international institutions. International Organization 52 (4). 943-969.
50. Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, institutions, and information. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
51. Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998. Sources of transparency: Information systems in international regimes. International Studies Quarterly 42: 109-130.
52. Morrow, James D. 1994. Modeling the forms of international cooperation: Distribution versus information. International Organization 48 (3). 387-423.
53. Morelli, Massimo, and Giovanni Maggi. Forthcoming. Self-enforcing voting in international organizations. American Economic Review.
54. Mueller, John. 1994. Policy and opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
55. Pevehouse, Jon. 2005. Democracy from above: Regional organizations and democratization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
56. Raymond, Gregory A. 1994. Democracies, disputes, and third party intermediaries. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (1). 24-42.
57. Rogers, James R. 2001. Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative-judicial interaction. American Journal of Political Science 45 (1). 84-99.
58. Reiter, Dan, and Allan Stam. 2002. Democracies at war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59. Russet, Bruce, and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating peace. New York: Norton.
60. Schultz, Kenneth. 2003. Tying hands and washing hands: The U.S. Congress and multilateral humanitarian intervention. In Locating the proper authorities: The interaction of international and domestic institutions, edited by Daniel Drezner, 105-142. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
61. Simmons, Beth. 2000. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review 94 (4). 819-835.
62. Stein, Arthur A. 1990. Why nations cooperate: Circumstance and choice in international organization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
63. Stone, Randall W. 2004. The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. American Political Science Review 98 (4). 577-591.
64. Thacker, Strom C. 1999. The high politics of IMF lending. World Politics 52 (October). 38-75.
65. Tharor, Sashi. 2003. Why America still needs the United Nations. Foreign Affairs 82: 67-80.
66. Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the logic of information transmission. International Organization 60 (1). 1-34.
67. Voeten, Erik. 2000. Clashes in the assembly. International Organization 54 (2). 185-215.
68. Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside options and the logic of Security Council action. American Political Science Review 95 (4). 845-859.
69. Voeten, Erik. 2005. The political origins of the UN Security Council's ability to legitimize the use of force. International Organization 59 (3). 527-559.
70. Vreeland, James R. 2003. The IMF and economic growth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
71. Wallander, Celeste. 2000. Institutional assets and adaptability: NATO after the cold war. International Organization 54 (4). 705-736.
72. Woodward, Bob. 2004. Plan of attack. New York: Simon & Schuster.