Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role of domestic groups

Economics and Politics

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 145-189

  Milner, Helen V ^a   Rosendorff, B Peter ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001494982     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00126.x     Document Type: Article

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