Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 307-340

  Moser, Christoph ^a   Sturm, Jan Egbert ^a,b  

^a KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^b CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Extreme bounds analysis; IMF; Lending facilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 80052059154     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-011-9120-y     Document Type: Article

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