Dirty pool

International Organization

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 441-468

  Green, Donald P ^a   Kim, Soo Yeon ^b   Yoon, David H ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035591072     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/00208180151140630     Document Type: Article

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