IMF conditionality: Theory and evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 141, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 233-267

  Dreher, Axel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Compliance; Conditionality; IMF; Implementation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349233779     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9486-z     Document Type: Article

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