A servant of two masters: Communication and the selection of international bureaucrats

International Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 245-275

  Johns, Leslie ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247375217     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818307070099     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Ainsworth, Scott, and Itai Sened. 1993. The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences. American Journal of Political Science 37 (3):834-66.
2. Albright, Madeleine. 2003. Madam Secretary. New York: Miramax Books.
3. Bailey, Sydney D., and Sam Daws. 1998. The Procedure of the UN Security Council. 3d ed. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
4. Baker, James A., III 1995. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992. New York: Putnam's Sons.
5. Binmore, Ken. 1987. Nash Bargaining Theory II. In The Economics of Bargaining, edited by Ken Binmore and Partha Dasgupta, 27-46. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell.
6. Blix, Hans. 2004. Disarming Iraq. New York: Pantheon Books.
7. Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism. Perspectives on Politics 3 (3):509-24.
8. Butler, Richard. 2000. The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Growing Crisis of Global Security. New York: Public Affairs.
9. Calvert, Randall L. 1985. The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice. Journal of Politics 47 (2):530-55.
10. Crawford, Vincent P., and Joel Sobel. 1982. Strategic Information Transmission. Econometrica 50 (6):1431-51.
11. Farrell, Joseph, and Robert Gibbons. 1989. Cheap Talk with Two Audiences. American Economic Review 79 (5):1214-23.
12. Farrell, Joseph, and Matthew Rabin. 1996. Cheap Talk. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (3):103-18.
13. Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 2000. Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
14. Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization 36 (2):325-55.
15. Kydd, Andrew. 2003. Which Side Are You on? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation. American Journal of Political Science 47 (4):597-611.
16. Milner, Helen V., and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1996. Trade Negotiation, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups. Economics and Politics 8 (2):145-89.
17. Morrow, James D. 1994. Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information. International Organization 48 (3):387-423.
18. Muthoo, Abhinay. 1999. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. Nash, John F., Jr. 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (2):155-62.
20. Osborne, Martin J. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
21. Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50 (1):97-110.
22. Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
23. U.S. National Security Council (NSC). 2002. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
24. Voeten, Erik. 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review 95 (4):845-58.
25. Volcker, Paul A. 2005. Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime. Report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, October 27. Available at 〈www.iic-offp.org/ documents/Final%20Report%2027Oct05/IIC%20Final%20Report%20- %20Cover%20and%20Index.pdf〉. Accessed 20 December 2006.