IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality

World Development

Volumn 34, Issue 5 SPEC. ISS., 2006, Pages 769-788

  Dreher, Axel ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

compliance; conditionality; growth; IMF programs

Indexed keywords

COMPLIANCE; CONDITIONALITY; ECONOMIC GROWTH; IMF; PANEL DATA;

EID: 33645955296     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.002     Document Type: Article

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