Multilateralism and democracy: A dissent regarding keohane, macedo, and moravcsik

International Organization

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 589-598

  Gartzke, Erik ^a   Naoi, Megumi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 80054964358     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818311000142     Document Type: Article

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