Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?

International Organization

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 379-406

  Downs, George W ^a   Rocke, David M ^a   Barsoom, Peter N ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030500365     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0020818300033427     Document Type: Article

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