Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 111, Issue 8, 2002, Pages 1935-2033

  Hathaway, Oona A ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347018221     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797642     Document Type: Article

References (445)

1. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
2. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
3. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
4. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
5. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
6. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
7. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted); see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3 (1995) ("[F]oreign policy practitioners operate on the assumption of a general propensity of states to comply with international obligations."); ANDREW T GUZMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPLIANCE BASED THEORY (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Sch. of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 47, 2001); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 (1997) (book review). But see Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980) (arguing against the importance of international law); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3 (same).
8. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
9. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
10. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
11. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
12. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
13. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
14. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
15. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
16. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
17. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998) ("[T]he first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal rules most of the time. We have impressions which may rise to the level of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time. . . ." (citations omitted)); Koh, supra note 1, at 2599-600 ("[S]cholars have generally avoided the causal question: If transnational actors do generally obey international law, why do they obey it, and why do they sometimes disobey it?"); S.M. Schwebel, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996) ("Compliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than confront."). There are some notable exceptions. E.g., Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?]; Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does It Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95 (1999); Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000); Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]. In recent years, legal scholars have paid more attention to the question of compliance. Indeed, the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law was entitled, "Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING: IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS (1997).
18. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 394 (R. Crowley trans., 1920).
19. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) ("International Relations scholars have traditionally had little time for [questions of international law]. Instead, they have regarded international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying states, and therefore of little relevance to how states actually behave."); George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996); Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 323-24 (2000) ("[M]ost legal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter . . . . Scholars of international relations, . . . however, have been far more skeptical.").
20. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) ("International Relations scholars have traditionally had little time for [questions of international law]. Instead, they have regarded international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying states, and therefore of little relevance to how states actually behave."); George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996); Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 323-24 (2000) ("[M]ost legal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter . . . . Scholars of international relations, . . . however, have been far more skeptical.").
21. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1999) ("International Relations scholars have traditionally had little time for [questions of international law]. Instead, they have regarded international law as something of an epiphenomenon, with rules of international law being dependent on power, subject to short-term alteration by power-applying states, and therefore of little relevance to how states actually behave."); George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996); Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 323-24 (2000) ("[M]ost legal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do indeed matter . . . . Scholars of international relations, . . . however, have been far more skeptical.").
22. See Simmons, supra note 4, at 326 (arguing that "competitive market forces" in the form of "[t]he risk of deterring international business [are] what give[] international monetary law its constraining influence").
23. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 235.
24. One other article undertakes a similar quantitative test of the relationship between human rights practices and treaty ratification and finds results similar to those reported in this Article. Keith, supra note 2.
25. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson provide a framework of analysis for what has traditionally been referred to simply as "compliance" that separates out notions of "implementation," "compliance," and "effectiveness." See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 4-6.
26. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson provide a framework of analysis for what has traditionally been referred to simply as "compliance" that separates out notions of "implementation," "compliance," and "effectiveness." See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 4-6.
27. For some excellent case studies of these relationships, see, for example, ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 2; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999), and A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE (2001).
28. For some excellent case studies of these relationships, see, for example, ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 2; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999), and A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE (2001).
29. For some excellent case studies of these relationships, see, for example, ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 2; THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999), and A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE (2001).
30. Indeed, this Article is the first step in a broader project that will include a senes of case studies that will test the findings of the statistical analyses and verify, strengthen, and deepen the arguments made in this Article. My earlier study of the impact of free trade agreement in the United States takes just such a case-study approach. See Oona A. Hathaway, Positve Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection, 52 INT'L ORG. 575 (1998).
31. In this Article, I use the terms "nation," "country," and "government" interchangeably to refer to various domestic-level governing institutions through which a series of individual take actions and make decisions. The process of national decisionmaking and the interaction between domestic and international players is of course important to a complete understanding of treaty compliance. This Article explores the role of domestic politics to a limited extend by examining the impact of the level of democratization of a country on its human rights practices and on its propensity to ratify human rights treaties, and by discussing possible explanations for countries' compliance practices. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 246. The role of domestic politics in treaty complaince is the subject of my ongoing research and will be addressed more fully in future work.
32. Simmons, supra note 2, at 832 (finding that "[o]nce we control for most of the obvious reasons a government may choose to restrict its current account, Article VIII status still emerges as a truly significant influence on the probability of choosing to restrict [the current account]").
33. Stanley Hoffmann, The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities, 10 INT'L ORG. 357, 364 (1956).
34. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
35. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
36. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
37. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
38. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
39. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
40. In law, much of the attention to intentional relations theory began with Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) [hereinafter Abbot, Modern International Relations Theory]. Progress since then has been slow but steady on both sides. Witness the Summer 2000 issue of International Organization, the flagship of international relations scholarship, which was devoted to international relations approaches to international law, and the American Journal of International Law, which has devoted several articles to charting the burgeoning interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361 (1999) Anne- Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., InternationaL Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998). For further commentary, see THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael Byers ed., 2000); and the American Society of International Law's planned conference in 2002, "The Legalization of International Relations/The Internationalization of Legal Relations."
41. My framing mirrors that of Robert O. Keohane. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997). For good summaries of the relationship between international relations theory and international legal scholarship, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 14; and Slaughter et al., supra note 14. See also Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 14, at 337-38; John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996);
42. My framing mirrors that of Robert O. Keohane. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997). For good summaries of the relationship between international relations theory and international legal scholarship, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 14; and Slaughter et al., supra note 14. See also Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 14, at 337-38; John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996);
43. My framing mirrors that of Robert O. Keohane. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997). For good summaries of the relationship between international relations theory and international legal scholarship, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 14; and Slaughter et al., supra note 14. See also Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 14, at 337-38; John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996);
44. My framing mirrors that of Robert O. Keohane. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997). For good summaries of the relationship between international relations theory and international legal scholarship, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 14; and Slaughter et al., supra note 14. See also Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 14, at 337-38; John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996);
45. My framing mirrors that of Robert O. Keohane. Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997). For good summaries of the relationship between international relations theory and international legal scholarship, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 14; and Slaughter et al., supra note 14. See also Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 14, at 337-38; John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996);
46. Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75 (1998).
47. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (Harper & Row 1946) (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1966); Keohane, supra note 15, at 489 ("The 'instrumentalist optic' focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calculations of interests by agents."); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
48. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (Harper & Row 1946) (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1966); Keohane, supra note 15, at 489 ("The 'instrumentalist optic' focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calculations of interests by agents."); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
49. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (Harper & Row 1946) (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1966); Keohane, supra note 15, at 489 ("The 'instrumentalist optic' focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calculations of interests by agents."); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
50. See EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (Harper & Row 1946) (1939); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1966); Keohane, supra note 15, at 489 ("The 'instrumentalist optic' focuses on interests and argues that rules and norms will matter only if they affect the calculations of interests by agents."); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
51. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 49 (labeling as "[t]he cynic's formula" the realist view that "since there is no body to enforce the law, nations will comply with international law only if it is in their interest to do so; they will disregard law or obligation if the advantages of violation outweigh the advantages of observance").
52. For critiques of classical realism, see, for example, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (1984); and Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG.
53. For critiques of classical realism, see, for example, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (1984); and Duncan Snidal, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 INT'L ORG.
54. See, e.g., Jeff Frieden, Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940, 42 INT'L ORG. 59 (1988) (seeking to understand why the United States was so slow to assume a position of leadership in the interwar years despite its power position in the world); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179 (1988) (finding that American trade policy remained liberal in the 1970s and 1980s despite the country's relative decline within the international economy); Michael Mastanduno, Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period, 42 INT'L ORG. 121 (1988) (finding that the United States was unable to maintain the trade regime it preferred in the 1950s, even though it was at the zenith of its hegemonic power).
55. See, e.g., Jeff Frieden, Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940, 42 INT'L ORG. 59 (1988) (seeking to understand why the United States was so slow to assume a position of leadership in the interwar years despite its power position in the world); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179 (1988) (finding that American trade policy remained liberal in the 1970s and 1980s despite the country's relative decline within the international economy); Michael Mastanduno, Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period, 42 INT'L ORG. 121 (1988) (finding that the United States was unable to maintain the trade regime it preferred in the 1950s, even though it was at the zenith of its hegemonic power).
56. See, e.g., Jeff Frieden, Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940, 42 INT'L ORG. 59 (1988) (seeking to understand why the United States was so slow to assume a position of leadership in the interwar years despite its power position in the world); Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42 INT'L ORG. 179 (1988) (finding that American trade policy remained liberal in the 1970s and 1980s despite the country's relative decline within the international economy); Michael Mastanduno, Trade as a
57. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
58. Id. at 118.
59. See CARR, supra note 16; MORGENTHAU, supra note 16. Of course, there remains a gaping hole in the logic of this argument: If nations are really just motivated by self-interest and international relations are simply guided by the interests of the most powerful states, why do countries bother with cheap talk about human rights? Part III of this Article attempts to provide an answer.
60. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 616 (1986).
61. WALTZ, supra note 20, at 200. Waltz states: Like some earlier great powers, we [the United States] can identify the presumed duty of the rich and powerful to help others with our own beliefs about what a better world would look like. England claimed to bear the white man's burden; France spoke of her mission civilisatrice. . . . For countries at the top, this is predictable behavior. Id. Curiously, Waltz does not explain where the powerful nations' commitment to human rights comes from or why nations would be willing to sacrifice more tangible interests and benefits in pursuit of human rights.
62. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 219-20 (2000) (arguing that "[a]lthough established democracies [in Europe] supported certain human rights declarations, they allied with dictatorships and transitional regimes in opposition to reciprocally binding human rights enforcement" (emphasis omitted)).
63. Authro's calculations, based on ratification information on treaties filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). I label as "universal human rights treaties" those treaties included in U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 419, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994) that are open to signature by any member of the United Nations without geographical or other restriction and that have binding legal power. See id. at xii. Several scholars have discussed the apparent aversion of the United States to human rights law. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) ("In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the Universal Declaration to be non-binding." (footnotes omitted)); M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994) ("The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time concealing their goals within layer upon layer of quoligications."); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2000) ("Washongton's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has began to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world.").
64. Authro's calculations, based on ratification information on treaties filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). I label as "universal human rights treaties" those treaties included in U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 419, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994) that are open to signature by any member of the United Nations without geographical or other restriction and that have binding legal power. See id. at xii. Several scholars have discussed the apparent aversion of the United States to human rights law. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) ("In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the Universal Declaration to be non-binding." (footnotes omitted)); M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994) ("The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time concealing their goals within layer upon layer of quoligications."); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2000) ("Washongton's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has began to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world.").
65. Authro's calculations, based on ratification information on treaties filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). I label as "universal human rights treaties" those treaties included in U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 419, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994) that are open to signature by any member of the United Nations without geographical or other restriction and that have binding legal power. See id. at xii. Several scholars have discussed the apparent aversion of the United States to human rights law. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) ("In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the Universal Declaration to be non-binding." (footnotes omitted)); M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994) ("The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time concealing their goals within layer upon layer of quoligications."); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2000) ("Washongton's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has began to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world.").
66. Authro's calculations, based on ratification information on treaties filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). I label as "universal human rights treaties" those treaties included in U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 419, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994) that are open to signature by any member of the United Nations without geographical or other restriction and that have binding legal power. See id. at xii. Several scholars have discussed the apparent aversion of the United States to human rights law. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) ("In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the Universal Declaration to be non-binding." (footnotes omitted)); M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994) ("The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time concealing their goals within layer upon layer of quoligications."); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2000) ("Washongton's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has began to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world.").
67. Authro's calculations, based on ratification information on treaties filed with the Secretary General of the United Nations. See United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002). I label as "universal human rights treaties" those treaties included in U.N. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 419, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/REV.5, U.N. Sales No. E.94.XIV.1 (1994) that are open to signature by any member of the United Nations without geographical or other restriction and that have binding legal power. See id. at xii. Several scholars have discussed the apparent aversion of the United States to human rights law. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) ("In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the Universal Declaration to be non-binding." (footnotes omitted)); M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: U.S. Evasion of the Spirit of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 357, 370-71 (1994) ("The United States has been the target of international criticism not so much for its own violations as for its unwillingness to use its position in the world to set a good example for others. The United States has a role to play as a member of the vanguard of nations trying to advocate human rights not only in theory, but in practice. It should assume this role and work for the improvement of rights in the world community rather than grudgingly ratifying treaties, while at the same time concealing their goals within layer upon layer of quoligications."); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2000) ("Washongton's cynical attitude toward international human rights law has began to weaken the US government's voice as an advocate for human rights around the world.").
68. See KEOHANE, supra note 18.
69. Other works in this vein include LISA L. MARTIN COERCIVE COOPERATION (1992), LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (2000), Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982), Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sactions During the Falkland Islands Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1992, at 143, and Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299 (1982).
70. Other works in this vein include LISA L. MARTIN COERCIVE COOPERATION (1992), LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (2000), Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982), Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sactions During the Falkland Islands Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1992, at 143, and Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299 (1982).
71. Other works in this vein include LISA L. MARTIN COERCIVE COOPERATION (1992), LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (2000), Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982), Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sactions During the Falkland Islands Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1992, at 143, and Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299 (1982).
72. Other works in this vein include LISA L. MARTIN COERCIVE COOPERATION (1992), LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (2000), Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982), Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sactions During the Falkland Islands Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1992, at 143, and Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299 (1982).
73. Other works in this vein include LISA L. MARTIN COERCIVE COOPERATION (1992), LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS (2000), Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 357 (1982), Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sactions During the Falkland Islands Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 1992, at 143, and Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 INT'L ORG. 299 (1982).
74. Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 269, 271 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) ("[I]nstitutionalist theory assumes that states are the principal actors in world politics and that they behave on the basis of their conceptions of their own self-interests.").
75. Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM 269, 271 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) ("[I]nstitutionalist theory assumes that states are the principal actors in world politics and that they behave on the basis of their conceptions of their own self-interests.").
76. For a thoughtful essay exploring the relationship between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism, see ROBERT O. KEOHANE, Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER 1 (1989).
77. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
78. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
79. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
80. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
81. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
82. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
83. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
84. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
85. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 221 ("Keohane recast modified Structural Realism as 'Neoliberal Institutionalism.'"). Some significant works on compliance in this vein include KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 61-64, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977), Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325 (1982), and Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 192-95 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). Other works on this topic include ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1989), ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994), Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985), Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD POL. 25 (1985), and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
86. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (defining "regimes" broadly as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area"). Relatedly, Keohane and Nye define "regimes" as "sets of governing arrangements" that include "networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects." KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 31, at 19.
87. For more on the evolution of modified structural realism, see Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986).
88. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19, 27 (1991).
89. KEOHANE, supra note 30, at 7.
90. Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International Institutions 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 121, 121 (1996).
91. See Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 32, at 141; Krasner, supra note 32.
92. Snidal, supra note 36, at 124.
93. Modern work in this vein generally uses the terms "regime" and "institution" interchangeably. See, e.g., Ronald B. Mitchell & Patricia M. Keilbach, Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange, 54 INT'L ORG. 891, 893 (2001) ("We also use the term regime interchangeably with institution.").
94. See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 762-63 (2001) ("We define international institutions as explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior. . . . The 1961 Vienna Law on Treaties is a good example."). For a collection of recent institutionalist work from the political science perspective, see the issue of International Organization in which the Koremenos article appears.
95. Koremenos et al., supra note 40, at 768 (emphasis omitted).
96. See Slaughter Burley, supra note 14, at 209-14.
97. John K. Setear, for instance, uses an institutionalist approach informed by rational choice theory to analyze the rules of release and remediation in the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility. See John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REV. 1 (1997); see also Setear, supra note 15 (taking an institutionalist approach to the law of treaties).
98. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (using the game-theoretic concepts that form the central focus of much international relations scholarship to provide an account of how customary international law arises, why nations comply with it, and how it changes over time).
99. GUZMAN, supra note 1.
100. Interestingly, Guzman's framework is in many ways entirely consistent with the managerial model discussed infra text accompanying notes 72-84, despite efforts by both sets of authors to emphasize the differences between the two approaches. Indeed, Guzman's work could be seen as providing a formal model of the amorphous threat of alienation from the "complex web of international arrangements" that is emphasized by Chayes and Chayes. See infra text accompanying note 82.
101. Setear, supra note 15, at 156 ("Most international lawyers would probably summarize the underlying structure of the law of treaties in a single phrase: the consent of sovereign nations.").
102. This view is reflected in the famous S.S. Lotus case, in which the Court of International Justice stated: "The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will . . . ."
103. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7);
104. see also Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27 (1989) ("[A] State is not subject to any external authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority.").
105. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 185 ("It is often said that the fundamental norm of international law is pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be obeyed).").
106. For the only comprehensive work on compliance from the rationalist view, see GUZMAN, supra note 1.
107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, § 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
108. Relatedly, states may be willing to make such changes to create and maintain a regime that satisfies their long-term interests. But such motivations depend on the existence of strong monitoring and enforcement to cause members to restrict their short-term interest-seeking to obtain long-term goals. Where direct sanctions are minimal, however, such motivations disappear.
109. See ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 16-32 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990) (listing all of the uses of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes between 1914 and 1990 and finding that out of 119 cases of sanctions, 63 of which involved sanctions imposed only by the United States, fewer than 25 were motivated in significant part by human rights concerns).
110. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1795).
111. Id. at 112.
112. Id. at 113.
113. The central work on this topic is Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1983). Doyle's findings were confirmed by a series of empirical studies, including most notably Zeev Maoz & Nasrin Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1989).
114. The central work on this topic is Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205 (1983). Doyle's findings were confirmed by a series of empirical studies, including most notably Zeev Maoz & Nasrin Abdolali, Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976, 33 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1989).
115. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION 39 (2d ed. 1999).
116. Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513 (1997).
117. See Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 499 (1987) (arguing that realist and institutionalist theories "downplay the central insight of interdependence theorists: foreign policy is integrally related to domestic structures and processes").
118. Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992); see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1995); Slaughter Burley, supra note 14.
119. Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992); see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1995); Slaughter Burley, supra note 14.
120. Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992); see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1995); Slaughter Burley, supra note 14.
121. Burley, supra note 61, at 1916-22.
122. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 278 (1997).
123. Id. at 331-35.
124. Id. at 334.
125. Cf. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 63 (making a similar argument with regard to supranational adjudication).
126. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
127. See Moravcsik, supra note 25. This thesis will be much more fully tested in a work in progress, Oona A. Hathaway, The Puzzle of Human Rights Treaty Formation: When and Why Do Nations Join Human Rights Regimes? (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
128. See Moravcsik, supra note 25. This thesis will be much more fully tested in a work in progress, Oona A. Hathaway, The Puzzle of Human Rights Treaty Formation: When and Why Do Nations Join Human Rights Regimes? (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
129. Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 228.
130. I find support for the supposition that newly established democracies, defined as countries with an 8 to 10 point democracy rating on a scale of 1 to 10 that have been in place fewer than thirty years, see infra Appendix B, Section G; see also Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 231-32 (defining newly established democracies - in a study of negotiations that took place in 1950 - as those established between 1920 and 1950), have worse practices than established democracies. In my data (in which higher ratings reflect worse practices), established democracies have Torture ratings of 1.71, compared to 2.50 for newly established democracies; Fair Trial ratings of 1.23, compared to 1.96 for newly established democracies; Civil Liberty ratings of 1.35, compared to 2.54 for newly established democracies; Genocide ratings of 0, compared to 0.035 for newly established democracies; and 89% Men in Parliament, compared to 95% for newly established democracies. See infra Section II.A (describing human rights measures). I do not find any evidence, however, that newly established democracies ratify human rights treaties more readily than do established democracies. See infra note 184.
131. Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 228.
132. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 3. For a strong critique of this approach and a defense of the enforcement model, see Downs et al., supra note 4.
133. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 2.
134. Id. at 2-3.
135. For more on Chayes and Chayes's views of military and economic sanctions, see id. at 34-67.
136. The assumption that countries tend to comply with international law is, they argue, supported by three types of considerations: efficiency, interests, and norms. Compliance with established treaty norms is efficient; treaties supply a standard operating procedure by which government actors can operate. Because a treaty is a consensual instrument, it must also serve the parties' interests, as they otherwise would not have agreed to it. They therefore must have some interest in maintaining its viability. And, finally, treaties are accepted to be legally binding instruments, which are obeyed because of shared norms of law abidance. Id. at 3-9.
137. Id. at 116.
138. Id. at 118.
139. "The rule that agreements and stipulations, esp. those contained in treaties, must be observed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1109 (7th ed. 1999).
140. Specifically, noncompliance occurs because of "ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language," "limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings," and time lags or failure of the treaty to adapt to changing conditions. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 9-17.
141. Id. at 25.
142. Id. at 27.
143. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT'L ORG. 185 (1994); Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 139 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
144. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT'L ORG. 185 (1994); Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 139 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
145. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT'L ORG. 185 (1994); Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 139 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
146. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT'L ORG. 185 (1994); Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 139 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
147. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1996); DAVID HALLORAN LUMSDAINE, MORAL VISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993); ROBERT W. MCELROY, MORALITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT'L ORG. 185 (1994); Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 139 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
148. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
149. Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998).
150. See, e.g., BRUCH RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1993).
151. Phillip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833 (1990) (book review).
152. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
153. Id. at 7.
154. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM J INT'L L. 705, 712 (1988).
155. FRANCK, supra note 87, at 7.
156. Franck, supra note 89.
157. FRANCK, supra note 87, at 30.
158. Id. at 99 ("The determinacy of a rule directly affects its legitimacy because in increasing the rule's transparency, its fairness is made manifest, and thus its compliance pull on members of the international community is increased."); see id. at 30-34.
159. Id. at 34-38.
160. Id. at 38.
161. Id. at 41-46.
162. Id. at 124.
163. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
164. FRANCK, supra note 87, at 103.
165. Id. at 104-05.
166. There are 1203 overdue reports in the human rights treaty system, while only 1613 reports have ever been considered. Seventy-one percent of all state parties to human rights treaties have overdue reports, and 110 states have five or more overdue reports. ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 8 (2000), http://www.yorku.ca/hrights/Report/finalreport.pdf; see Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 15, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996). In its 1999 Annual Report, the Human Rights Committee reported that since 1977, it had received 873 communications (despite the fact that the Optional Protocol that governs the individual complaint system under the treaty covers over one billion people around the world). Of those, the Committee had concluded 328 by issuing its views, declared 267 inadmissible, discontinued 129, and not yet concluded 149.
167. There are 1203 overdue reports in the human rights treaty system, while only 1613 reports have ever been considered. Seventy-one percent of all state parties to human rights treaties have overdue reports, and 110 states have five or more overdue reports. ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 8 (2000), http://www.yorku.ca/hrights/Report/finalreport.pdf; see Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 15, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996). In its 1999 Annual Report, the Human Rights Committee reported that since 1977, it had received 873 communications (despite the fact that the Optional Protocol that governs the individual complaint system under the treaty covers over one billion people around the world). Of those, the Committee had concluded 328 by issuing its views, declared 267 inadmissible, discontinued 129, and not yet concluded 149.
168. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 740 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000).
169. Koh, supra note 1; see Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?].
170. Koh, supra note 1; see Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?].
171. Koh, supra note 1; see Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?].
172. Koh, supra note 1; see Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?].
173. Koh, supra note 1; see Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Bringing International Law Home]; Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?].
174. Koh, supra note 1, at 2646.
175. Id. at 2648.
176. Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 102, at 1407.
177. Koh, supra note 1, at 2656.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2656-57.
180. Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra note 102, at 1407-08.
181. Indeed, Koh has put forward a guide for United States human rights policy for the twenty-first century that draws on and builds upon his transnational legal process framework. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002). More so than any of the theories outlined in this Article, Koh's theory of transnational legal process speaks directly to those who seek, as he puts it, to "bring international law home" - the lawyers, activists, politicians, and others who carry out the process of norminternalization.
182. Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 102, at 680-81.
183. See Jacob S. Hacker, Learning from Defeat?: Political Analysis and the Failure of Health Care Reform in the United States, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 61, 91-92 (2001) (discussing the difference between predictability and explainability).
184. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76, 86-92.
185. The data sources for treaty ratification are described in Appendix B. In this Article, I look only at whether a country has ratified a treaty. I do not take into account any reservations the country may have made to the treaty. I do this both because quantifying reservations in a consistent way would be extremely difficult and because a reservation to a treaty is only valid if it does not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 19, S. EXEC. DOC. L, 92-1, at 16 (1971), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37. A reservation that falls within this limitation ought not significantly affect the reserving country's human rights practices covered by the treaty.
186. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also
187. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard, Assessing National Human Rights Performance: Theoretical Framework, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 214 (1988) (seeking to establish a framework for assessing states' human rights performance); James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell Human Kights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997) (arguing for the use of a disaggregated, multidimensional measure of human rights violations); Herbert F. Spirer, Violations of Human Rights - How Many?: The Statistical Problems of Measuring Such Infractions Are Tough, but Statistical Science Is Equal to It, 49 AM. J. ECON & SOC. 199 (1990) (reviewing statistical problems encountered in measuring and analyzing human rights violations). The four most prominent sources of comprehensive cross-national time series information on a broad spectrum of human rights practices are the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch's reports, Amnesty International's Country Reports, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports (There are, of course, many other sources of data on human rights practices, but most do not cover all or nearly all countries in the world over a substantial period of time, as is necessary for the instant analysis.) Each of these data sources has advantages and drawbacks. The State Department reports, for instance, have been charged with political bias. E.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1007 (1987) (citing and briefly discussing reports of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and critiquing the State Department reports for political bias). The Freedom House reports, which are the only ones of the four to provide a quantifiable measure of human rights practices, have been criticized for lack of replicabihty and reliability. Christopher Mitchell et al., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 1, 20 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986). The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are relatively short and do not cover every country every year, making them a poor source for social scientific inquiry.
188. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard, Assessing National Human Rights Performance: Theoretical Framework, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 214 (1988) (seeking to establish a framework for assessing states' human rights performance); James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell Human Kights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997) (arguing for the use of a disaggregated, multidimensional measure of human rights violations); Herbert F. Spirer, Violations of Human Rights - How Many?: The Statistical Problems of Measuring Such Infractions Are Tough, but Statistical Science Is Equal to It, 49 AM. J. ECON & SOC. 199 (1990) (reviewing statistical problems encountered in measuring and analyzing human rights violations). The four most prominent sources of comprehensive cross-national time series information on a broad spectrum of human rights practices are the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch's reports, Amnesty International's Country Reports, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports (There are, of course, many other sources of data on human rights practices, but most do not cover all or nearly all countries in the world over a substantial period of time, as is necessary for the instant analysis.) Each of these data sources has advantages and drawbacks. The State Department reports, for instance, have been charged with political bias. E.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1007 (1987) (citing and briefly discussing reports of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and critiquing the State Department reports for political bias). The Freedom House reports, which are the only ones of the four to provide a quantifiable measure of human rights practices, have been criticized for lack of replicabihty and reliability. Christopher Mitchell et al., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 1, 20 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986). The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are relatively short and do not cover every country every year, making them a poor source for social scientific inquiry.
189. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard, Assessing National Human Rights Performance: Theoretical Framework, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 214 (1988) (seeking to establish a framework for assessing states' human rights performance); James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell Human Kights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997) (arguing for the use of a disaggregated, multidimensional measure of human rights violations); Herbert F. Spirer, Violations of Human Rights - How Many?: The Statistical Problems of Measuring Such Infractions Are Tough, but Statistical Science Is Equal to It, 49 AM. J. ECON & SOC. 199 (1990) (reviewing statistical problems encountered in measuring and analyzing human rights violations). The four most prominent sources of comprehensive cross-national time series information on a broad spectrum of human rights practices are the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch's reports, Amnesty International's Country Reports, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports (There are, of course, many other sources of data on human rights practices, but most do not cover all or nearly all countries in the world over a substantial period of time, as is necessary for the instant analysis.) Each of these data sources has advantages and drawbacks. The State Department reports, for instance, have been charged with political bias. E.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1007 (1987) (citing and briefly discussing reports of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and critiquing the State Department reports for political bias). The Freedom House reports, which are the only ones of the four to provide a quantifiable measure of human rights practices, have been criticized for lack of replicabihty and reliability. Christopher Mitchell et al., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 1, 20 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986). The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are relatively short and do not cover every country every year, making them a poor source for social scientific inquiry.
190. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard, Assessing National Human Rights Performance: Theoretical Framework, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 214 (1988) (seeking to establish a framework for assessing states' human rights performance); James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell Human Kights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997) (arguing for the use of a disaggregated, multidimensional measure of human rights violations); Herbert F. Spirer, Violations of Human Rights - How Many?: The Statistical Problems of Measuring Such Infractions Are Tough, but Statistical Science Is Equal to It, 49 AM. J. ECON & SOC. 199 (1990) (reviewing statistical problems encountered in measuring and analyzing human rights violations). The four most prominent sources of comprehensive cross-national time series information on a broad spectrum of human rights practices are the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch's reports, Amnesty International's Country Reports, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports (There are, of course, many other sources of data on human rights practices, but most do not cover all or nearly all countries in the world over a substantial period of time, as is necessary for the instant analysis.) Each of these data sources has advantages and drawbacks. The State Department reports, for instance, have been charged with political bias. E.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1007 (1987) (citing and briefly discussing reports of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and critiquing the State Department reports for political bias). The Freedom House reports, which are the only ones of the four to provide a quantifiable measure of human rights practices, have been criticized for lack of replicabihty and reliability. Christopher Mitchell et al., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 1, 20 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986). The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are relatively short and do not cover every country every year, making them a poor source for social scientific inquiry.
191. See, e.g., Robert E. Robertson, Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation To Devote the "Maximum Available Resources" to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 693, 703-13 (1994) (discussing the difficulties of measuring compliance with certain provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); see also Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard, Assessing National Human Rights Performance: Theoretical Framework, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 214 (1988) (seeking to establish a framework for assessing states' human rights performance); James M. McCormick & Neil J. Mitchell Human Kights Violations, Umbrella Concepts, and Empirical Analysis, 49 WORLD POL. 510 (1997) (arguing for the use of a disaggregated, multidimensional measure of human rights violations); Herbert F. Spirer, Violations of Human Rights - How Many?: The Statistical Problems of Measuring Such Infractions Are Tough, but Statistical Science Is Equal to It, 49 AM. J. ECON & SOC. 199 (1990) (reviewing statistical problems encountered in measuring and analyzing human rights violations). The four most prominent sources of comprehensive cross-national time series information on a broad spectrum of human rights practices are the United States Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights, Human Rights Watch's reports, Amnesty International's Country Reports, and Freedom House's Freedom in the World reports (There are, of course, many other sources of data on human rights practices, but most do not cover all or nearly all countries in the world over a substantial period of time, as is necessary for the instant analysis.) Each of these data sources has advantages and drawbacks. The State Department reports, for instance, have been charged with political bias. E.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1002, 1007 (1987) (citing and briefly discussing reports of Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights and critiquing the State Department reports for political bias). The Freedom House reports, which are the only ones of the four to provide a quantifiable measure of human rights practices, have been criticized for lack of replicabihty and reliability. Christopher Mitchell et al., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION 1, 20 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986). The Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports are relatively short and do not cover every country every year, making them a poor source for social scientific inquiry.
192. Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 2, at 4-6 (disaggregating the notions of implementation, compliance, and effectiveness).
193. Id. at 4 (identifying various dimensions of compliance).
194. This focus on state practice permits a comparison of the practices of ratifying and nonratifying countries. A broader focus would make a comparison difficult, as nonratifying countries cannot necessarily be expected to comply with the procedural or legislative requirements of a treaty. This narrower focus also centers attention on what ought to be the central concern - whether treaties make a difference in people's lives.
195. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 17.
196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 705 (1986).
197. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he torturer has become -like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."); Regina v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (recognizing the inviolability of the international prohibition against torture and therefore allowing extradition proceedings against General Augusto Pinochet to go forward); Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT'L ORG. 633, 634 (2000);
198. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he torturer has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."); Regina v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (recognizing the inviolability of the international prohibition against torture and therefore allowing extradition proceedings against General Augusto Pinochet to go forward); Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT'L ORG. 633, 634 (2000);
199. Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 138 (2000) ("[C]ommon examples of [j]us cogens include the duty to respect human rights and the prohibition of genocide.").
200. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14 (defining torture); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, S. EXEC. DOC. O, 81-1, at 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (defining genocide).
201. See infra text accompanying notes 141-157 (describing the data on fair trials and civil liberty).
202. See infra text accompanying notes 158-161 (describing the data on women's political equality).
203. For example, the dispute over whether punishment inflicted pursuant to the Sharia constitutes "torture" in violation of the Torture Convention was resolved in this study in favor of the countries arguing that it does not constitute torture.
204. In coding the torture practices of countries, I considered only torture committed by agents of the state. Genocide is defined by the authors of the State Failure Problem Set from which I drew my data in part as "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents - or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities - that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group." Ted Robert Gurr et al., Codebook: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996, at 11 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (emphasis added). The Civil Liberty index also measures freedoms largely in the control of the state, such as free and independent media, free religious institutions, free public and private religious expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of political organization, free trade unions, and peasant organizations or the equivalent. Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1999-2000, at 584 (Adrian Karatnycky ed., 2000) (providing a civil liberties checklist). Finally, whether or not a state provides a fair and public trial is a matter largely within the hands of the state. These areas all contrast markedly with the examples of areas where the state "lacks capacity" cited by Chayes and Chayes, such as agreements to reduce environmental pollutants, which require the state to influence private behavior. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 13-15.
205. In coding the torture practices of countries, I considered only torture committed by agents of the state. Genocide is defined by the authors of the State Failure Problem Set from which I drew my data in part as "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents - or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities - that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group." Ted Robert Gurr et al., Codebook: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996, at 11 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (emphasis added). The Civil Liberty index also measures freedoms largely in the control of the state, such as free and independent media, free religious institutions, free public and private religious expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of political organization, free trade unions, and peasant organizations or the equivalent. Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1999-2000, at 584 (Adrian Karatnycky ed., 2000) (providing a civil liberties checklist). Finally, whether or not a state provides a fair and public trial is a matter largely within the hands of the state. These areas all contrast markedly with the examples of areas where the state "lacks capacity" cited by Chayes and Chayes, such as agreements to reduce environmental pollutants, which require the state to influence private behavior. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 13-15.
206. In coding the torture practices of countries, I considered only torture committed by agents of the state. Genocide is defined by the authors of the State Failure Problem Set from which I drew my data in part as "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents - or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities - that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group." Ted Robert Gurr et al., Codebook: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996, at 11 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (emphasis added). The Civil Liberty index also measures freedoms largely in the control of the state, such as free and independent media, free religious institutions, free public and private religious expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of political organization, free trade unions, and peasant organizations or the equivalent. Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1999-2000, at 584 (Adrian Karatnycky ed., 2000) (providing a civil liberties checklist). Finally, whether or not a state provides a fair and public trial is a matter largely within the hands of the state. These areas all contrast markedly with the examples of areas where the state "lacks capacity" cited by Chayes and Chayes, such as agreements to reduce environmental pollutants, which require the state to influence private behavior. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 13-15.
207. A list of the 166 states included in the database (one of which is the United States) appears in Appendix C. Notably, none of the analyses takes advantage of the full database, as there are significant gaps in the data for many of the variables, and an entire observation is dropped whenever any portion of the data is missing. Nonetheless, with the exception of the analyses of the regional treaties, most of the analyses are based on well over 1000 observations.
208. See infra notes 137-151 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 114.
210. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 853, 855 (1994) ("Because of the rather high correlation between the two measures in our sample [i.e., the Amnesty International reports and the State Department reports] (zero-order correlation = 0.83), we instead chose to substitute the value coded for the State Department scale when profile information was unavailable on a country in the Amnesty International reports and vice versa (in the few cases where it was necessary) as the best available approximation of those scores."); id. at 862 (displaying a graph that shows increasing convergence between the data derived from the State Department reports and the data from the Amnesty International reports over time, with no more than an approximate 0.1-point difference in mean index on a scale of 1 to 5 between the two measures after 1985).
212. Keith, supra note 2. Keith states: For this study, the perfect measure of human rights behavior might include an indicator of each right that is protected in this treaty. . . . It would be extremely difficult to gather data that could adequately measure each of these rights. However, political scientists have developed two standards-based indices that are believed to be an acceptable measure for this study: the Freedom House Political and Civil Rights indices and Stohl et al.'s Personal Integrity measure [referred to here as the "Purdue Political Terror Scale" see infra note 170]. Using both of these sets of measures to test my hypothesis will allow for cross-validation. Id. at 101 (citations omitted).
213. Ted Robert Gurr et al., Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1954-1996 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished data, on file with author).
214. Gurr et al., supra note 125, at 11.
215. Id.
216. The scale is as follows: 0 = less than 300 annual deaths; 0.5 = 300-1000; 1.0 = 1000-2000; 1.5 = 2000-4000; 2.0 = 4000-8000; 2.5 = 8000-16,000; 3.0 = 16,000-32,000; 3.5 = 32,000-64,000; 4.0 = 64,000-128,000; 4.5 = 128,000-256,000; 5.0 = 256,000 or more, See id. at 12.
217. Genocide Convention, supra note 121, art. 2, S. EXEC. DOC. O, 81-1, at 7, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
218. The Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising from, or inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14. The American Torture Convention defines torture as any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article. Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987) [hereinafter American Torture Convention]; see also European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, pmbl., Europ T.S. No. 126 at 2, 27 I.L.M. 1152, 1154 (entered into force Jan. 2, 1989) [hereinafter European Torture Convention] (prohibiting, but not defining, torture); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter on Human Rights] (same).
219. The Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising from, or inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14. The American Torture Convention defines torture as any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article. Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987) [hereinafter American Torture Convention]; see also European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, pmbl., Europ T.S. No. 126 at 2, 27 I.L.M. 1152, 1154 (entered into force Jan. 2, 1989) [hereinafter European Torture Convention] (prohibiting, but not defining, torture); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter on Human Rights] (same).
220. The Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising from, or inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14. The American Torture Convention defines torture as any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article. Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987) [hereinafter American Torture Convention]; see also European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, pmbl., Europ T.S. No. 126 at 2, 27 I.L.M. 1152, 1154 (entered into force Jan. 2, 1989) [hereinafter European Torture Convention] (prohibiting, but not defining, torture); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter on Human Rights] (same).
221. The Torture Convention defines torture as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising from, or inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113-14. The American Torture Convention defines torture as any act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in this article. Inter-American Convention To Prevent and Punish Torture, adopted Dec. 9, 1985, art. 2, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987) [hereinafter American Torture Convention]; see also European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, pmbl., Europ T.S. No. 126 at 2, 27 I.L.M. 1152, 1154 (entered into force Jan. 2, 1989) [hereinafter European Torture Convention] (prohibiting, but not defining, torture); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter on Human Rights] (same).
222. "Reproducibility reliability is the extent to which coding decisions can be replicated by different researchers." Stephen Lacy & Daniel Riffe, Sampling Error and Selecting Intercoder Reliability Samples for Nominal Content Categories, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 963, 963 (1996).
223. Jean Carletta, Assessing Agreement on Classification Tasks: The Kappa Statistic, 22 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 249, 252-53 (1996).
224. See infra Appendix C.
225. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 26, 21 I.L.M. at 63 ("States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts . . . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8, § 1, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147 (entered into force July 18, 1978) ("Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25-26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal . . . .").
226. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("Every individual shall have the right to . . . defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice . . . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]very person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . . the right of the accused to . . . be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel; . . . the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the State, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 3, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to . . . defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . . ."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . . to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.").
227. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 601 ("Every individual shall have the right to . . . defence . . . ."); American Covention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]very person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . . [t]he right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 3, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to . . . defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . . ."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . . to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . . .").
228. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 601 ("Every individual shall have the right to . . . be presumed innocent until proved guilty . . . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S at 147 ("Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 2, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.").
229. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("Every individual shall have the right to . . . an appeal to competent national organs . . . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]ery person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . . the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 2, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.").
230. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]very person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . . the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the tribunal or court . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 3, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to . . . have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . . to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.").
231. See African Charter on Human Righrs, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 9, 144 U.N.T.S. at 148 ("No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 15, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 7, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed.").
232. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 5, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interest of justice."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 1, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time . . . . Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary m the opinion of the court m special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.").
233. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 6, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]very person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: . . . prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 3, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled to . . . be informed promptly and in detail in language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him . . . ."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, § 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: . . . to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.").
234. See African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137, art. 7, 21 I.L.M. at 60 ("Every individual shall have the right . . . to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal . . . ."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 8, § 2, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147 ("[E]very person is entitled, with full equality, to . . . adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense . . . ."); Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 14, § 3, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177 ("[E]veryone shall be entitled . . . to be tried without undue delay . . . ."); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228 ("[E]everyone is entitled to a fair and publid hearing within a reasonable time . . . .").
235. See infra Appendix C.
236. For the set of ratings for the entire history of the Freedom in the World reports, see Freedom House, Country Ratings, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm (last modified May 8, 2001). Freedom House graciously provided the ratings to me in a database format.
237. See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 125, at 584-83.
238. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98.
239. African Charter on Human Rights, supra note 137.
240. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141.
241. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141.
242. Where a country's legislature is divided into two houses, I added the two houses together before calculating the percentage of men in the legislature.
243. INTER-PARLIAMINTARY UNION, WOMEN IN PARLIAMENTS 1945-1995: A WORLD STATISTICAL SURVY (1995).
244. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, pmbl., 27 U.S.T. 1909, 1911, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 (entered into force July 7, 1954).
245. Id. arts. II-III, 27 U.S.T. at 1911, 193 U.N.T.S. at 138.
246. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98.
247. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
248. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, supra note 160.
249. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 21, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 26-27, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 118-20.
250. Id. art. 22, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 27-28, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 120.
251. For the regional torture conventions, I use the European Torture Convention and the American Torture Convention rather than the European Convention on Human Rights and American Convention on Human Rights (both of which also prohibit torture) because the more particularized treaties give specific content to the torture prohibition and put in place mechanisms to make the prohibition on torture more effective.
252. Although today all the members of the Council of Europe have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, this has not always been true. Until ratification of the Convention was made an effective condition of membership, most countries took several years or more to ratify the Convention after joining the Council. Because the data set is a time series, this is the basis for the comparison of ratifying country-years (again, referred to here with the shorthand "countries") versus nonratifying country-years in the European context.
253. The treaties specifically require the elements of fair and public trials measured by the Fair Trial index. For more on the index, see supra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
254. I obtain nearly identical results using the Purdue Political Terror Scale (PTS), a measure of political repression put together by researchers at Purdue University based on the United States Department of State reports and the Amnesty International annual reports on country human rights practices. See Michael Stohl, Purdue University Political Terror Scale, at http://www,ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/govern.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). Using this measure, I find that countries that ratify the African Charter on Human Rights have an average PTS (State) index of 2.89 versus 2.50 for nonratifiers (on a scale of 1 to 5, where lower is better), and an verage PTS (Amnesty) index of 2.96 versus 2.73 for nonratifiers. Similarly, I find that countries that have ratified the European Torture Convention have an average PTS (State) index of 1.67 versus 1.47 for nonratifiers, and an average PTS (Amnesty) index of 2.32 versus 1.61 for nonratifiers.
255. Countries with a democracy rating of 10 make up roughly 18% of the entire sample. For more on the democracy scale, see infra Appendix B, Section G.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
257. Unlike the group of nations as a whole, fully democratic countries that ratify the American Convention on Human Rights have worse Civil Liberty ratings on average than those that do not. And, unlike the group of nations as a whole, fully democratic nations that ratify the African Charter on Human Rights have better average Fair Trial ratings than those that do not ratify. This mean is based, however, on a population size of only five. Moreover, when the group of democratic countries is enlarged to include countries with a democracy rating of 6 or above, the mean Fair Trial rating of ratifying countries for the African Charter is worse than that of nonratifying countries. (There are thirty-seven observations involving countries in the OAU with a democracy rating of 6 or above.) The mean level of the Fair Trial measure for countries ratifying the African Charter on Human Rights is 2, versus a level of 1.5 for nonratifying countries.
258. Thirty-six percent of the entire data set has a democracy rating of 6 or greater. In the case of the Genocide Convention, the average level of Genocide if the treaty is ratified is 0.016, compared to 0.014 if it is not, for the 3077 observations in the database. In the case of the Optional Protocol, the average Civil Liberty rating if the treaty is ratified is 2.52, compared to 2.10 if it is not, for the 1576 observations in the database.
259. For instance, for genocide, which is measured on a scale from 0 to 5, I determined the mean level of ratification of the Genocide Convention for countries with a level 0 Genocide, a level 0.5 Genocide, a level 1 Genocide, and so on, and plotted them on the graph in Figure 1. Because the data cover nearly forty years (all of which post-date the entry into force of the Genocide Convention), each country is included multiple times in the data from which I generated the graph. Hence, the figures are not a point-in-time record of the relationship between human rights practices and ratification of the relevant treaty; rather, they reflect the relationship over the thirty-nine years covered by the data. I calculated ratification rates for the regional treaties using a subset of the database that included only countries that are eligible to join the relevant treaty. Hence, I limited the database to members of the Organization of American States for the American treaties, members of the Organization of African Unity for the African treaties, and members of the Council of Europe for the European treaties.
260. I omitted data points that relied on fewer than fifteen observations. For instance, fewer than fifteen country-years registered as a 4.5 or 5 on the Genocide scale.
261. Such countries ratified the Genocide Convention at an average rate of 40%. Countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10 and with a Genocide rating of 0 ratified the Genocide Convention at an average rate of 49%. Although some of these countries received slightly higher Genocide ratings, not enough of these met the fifteen-observation minimum, and I therefore omitted these data from the graph. See supra note 176.
262. Again, I reach similar results using the Purdue Political Terror Scales. See supra note 170.
263. Although I do not include these results in the figure below, it is interesting to note that for this figure, as for all those that follow, when the group of democratic countries examined is expanded to include countries with democracy ratings of 6 or above, the results are very similar to those for the entire data set, though the ratification rates at each level of Torture tend to be slightly higher over most of the graph. For the Torture Convention, the ratification rates for countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10 is 49% for those with Torture ratings of 1, 60% for those with ratings of 2, 47% for those with ratings of 3, 40% for those with ratings of 4, and 51% for those with ratings of 5. For Article 21, the ratification rates are 42% for those with ratings of 1, 33% for those with ratings of 2, 18% for those with ratings of 3, 8% for those with ratings of 4, and 2% for those with ratings of 5. For the ratification rates for the other conventions for countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10, see infra notes 180-182.
264. When the group of democratic countries is expanded to include all countries with democracy ratings of 6 or above, the curves exhibit a shape nearly identical to that of the full set of countries. For the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ratification rates for countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10 are 81% of those with a Fair Trial rating of 1, 69% of those with a rating of 2, 78% of those with a rating of 3, and 60% of those with a rating of 4. For the Optional Protocol, the ratification rates for countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10 are 63% of those with a rating of 1, 48% of those with a rating of 2, 51% of those with a rating of 3, and 53% of those with a rating of 4.
265. When the group of democratic countries is expanded to include all countries with a democracy rating of 6 or above, the parabolic shape disappears, and the curve reverts to a shape much more similar to that for the set of countries as a whole. For the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the ratification rates for countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10 are 70% for those with Civil Liberty codes of 1, 66% for those with codes of 2, 62% for
266. This observation holds for both the narrower and broader categories of democracy. For countries with democracy ratings of 6 to 10, the ratification rates are 76% for the first quartile, 68% for the second, 57% for the third, and 45% for the fourth.
267. As Figures 2 and 4 show, full democracies (countries with a democracy rating 10 on a scale of 1 to 10) that have the best ratings are less likely to ratify the relevant human rights treaties than are full democracies with slightly worse ratings.
268. For the republican liberal explanation, see Moravcsik, supra note 25, at 225-30. If newly established, unstable democracies have worse practices than established, stable democracies, as my data seem to suggest, then the supposition that newly established and potentially unstable democracies are more likely to be supporters of binding human rights regimes than are either established democracies or nondemocracies might help explain a positive association between ratification and worse human rights practices. See supra text accompanying notes 67-71. It is worth noting, however, that a comparison of the mean ratification rates of newly established democracies (defined here as those with democracy ratings of 8 to 10 on a 1 to 10 scale that were fewer than thirty years old at the time the treaty under examination came into force) with established democracies (defined here as those with democracy rating of 8 to 10 on a 1 to 10 scale that were thirty year old or more at the time the treaty under examination came into force) across all the country-years following enactment of the treaty under under consideration does not show a higher propensity to ratify among newly established democracies. Established democracies are more likely to ratify than newly established democracies in five out of eleven treaties - the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (73% versus 72%), Article 21 (19% versus 14%), the Optional Protocol (39% versus 38%), the Genocide Convention (73% versus 69%), and the European Convention on Human Rights (92% versus 90%) - and newly established democracies are more likely to ratify than more established democracies in four out of eleven treaties - the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (53% versus 51%), the Torture Convention (30% versus 23%), the American Convention on Human Rights (77% versus 46%), and the European Torture Convention (44% versus 27%). For the remaining two treaties, there were no countries that met the established democracy criteria and hence a comparison was impossible. When the definition of "democracy" is expanded to include countries that are rated 6 to 10 on a 1 to 10 scale, I find that in eight out of eleven traties, established democracies are more likely to ratify that are newly established democracies, and in one out of eleven treaties - the American Convention on Human Rights - newly established democracies are more likely to ratify than established democracies. Again, for the remaining two treaties, there were no countries that met the "established democracy" criteria. These findings do not preclude the possibility that newly established democracies are more likely to ratify that are established democracies, controlling fo other characteristics. This hypothesis will be much more fully tested in work in progress. See Hathayay, supra note 68.
269. See. e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 182 (1973) (finding a positive relationship between "internal war" and "negative sanctions" by government); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 132 (1991) (conducting a cross-national study for 1986 and finding that democracy and energy consumption per capita (a measure of economic wealth) are negatively correlated with political repression and that inequality is positively correlated with political repression); Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) (hypothesizing a link between population density and repression, but finding no statistically significant relationship and finding that population growth has a statistically significant positive relationship to the level of repression); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988) (finding weak support for the contention that wealthier nations have better human rights records than poorer nations); Poe & Tate, supra note 130, at 861, 866-67 (finding that population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy and economic standing have a negative and statistically significant impact); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 306 (1999) (finding that population size, population growth, and civil war have a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy, per capita GNP, and economic growth have a negative and statistically significant impact).
270. See. e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 182 (1973) (finding a positive relationship between "internal war" and "negative sanctions" by government); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 132 (1991) (conducting a cross-national study for 1986 and finding that democracy and energy consumption per capita (a measure of economic wealth) are negatively correlated with political repression and that inequality is positively correlated with political repression); Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) (hypothesizing a link between population density and repression, but finding no statistically significant relationship and finding that population growth has a statistically significant positive relationship to the level of repression); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988) (finding weak support for the contention that wealthier nations have better human rights records than poorer nations); Poe & Tate, supra note 130, at 861, 866-67 (finding that population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy and economic standing have a negative and statistically significant impact); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 306 (1999) (finding that population size, population growth, and civil war have a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy, per capita GNP, and economic growth have a negative and statistically significant impact).
271. See. e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 182 (1973) (finding a positive relationship between "internal war" and "negative sanctions" by government); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 132 (1991) (conducting a cross-national study for 1986 and finding that democracy and energy consumption per capita (a measure of economic wealth) are negatively correlated with political repression and that inequality is positively correlated with political repression); Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) (hypothesizing a link between population density and repression, but finding no statistically significant relationship and finding that population growth has a statistically significant positive relationship to the level of repression); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988) (finding weak support for the contention that wealthier nations have better human rights records than poorer nations); Poe & Tate, supra note 130, at 861, 866-67 (finding that population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy and economic standing have a negative and statistically significant impact); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 306 (1999) (finding that population size, population growth, and civil war have a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy, per capita GNP, and economic growth have a negative and statistically significant impact).
272. See. e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 182 (1973) (finding a positive relationship between "internal war" and "negative sanctions" by government); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 132 (1991) (conducting a cross-national study for 1986 and finding that democracy and energy consumption per capita (a measure of economic wealth) are negatively correlated with political repression and that inequality is positively correlated with political repression); Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) (hypothesizing a link between population density and repression, but finding no statistically significant relationship and finding that population growth has a statistically significant positive relationship to the level of repression); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988) (finding weak support for the contention that wealthier nations have better human rights records than poorer nations); Poe & Tate, supra note 130, at 861, 866-67 (finding that population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy and economic standing have a negative and statistically significant impact); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 306 (1999) (finding that population size, population growth, and civil war have a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy, per capita GNP, and economic growth have a negative and statistically significant impact).
273. See. e.g., DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS-NATIONAL CAUSAL ANALYSIS 182 (1973) (finding a positive relationship between "internal war" and "negative sanctions" by government); Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 132 (1991) (conducting a cross-national study for 1986 and finding that democracy and energy consumption per capita (a measure of economic wealth) are negatively correlated with political repression and that inequality is positively correlated with political repression); Conway W. Henderson, Population Pressures and Political Repression, 74 SOC. SCI. Q. 322 (1993) (hypothesizing a link between population density and repression, but finding no statistically significant relationship and finding that population growth has a statistically significant positive relationship to the level of repression); Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988) (finding weak support for the contention that wealthier nations have better human rights records than poorer nations); Poe & Tate, supra note 130, at 861, 866-67 (finding that population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy and economic standing have a negative and statistically significant impact); Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 291, 306 (1999) (finding that population size, population growth, and civil war have a positive and statistically significant impact on political repression and that democracy, per capita GNP, and economic growth have a negative and statistically significant impact).
274. It is possible that democracies are not only more likely to have better practices but that they are more likely to have cumbersome ratification processes that lead them to ratify treaties at a lower rate than otherwise expected. Because I control for the level of democracy in the analysis, this dynamic ought not have a substantial effect on the results.
275. Compare Mancur Olson, Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force, 23 J. ECON. HIST. 529 (1963) (arguing that economic growth will increase repression because it increases instability),
276. and Conway W. Henderson, Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 120, 126 (1991) (hypothesizing that "the greater the rate of growth in the economy, the more likely the government will be to use repression"), with Poe et al., supra note 185, at 294 (suggesting that increasing prosperity has the opposite effect, satisfying those who would otherwise rebel and thereby promoting stability and reducing the need for repression).
277. For more on these variables, see infra Appendix B.
278. See infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text (discussing autocorrelation).
279. I expect that human rights treaties, if they have effects on country practices, do so relatively slowly. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 16 ("The effort to protect human rights by international agreement may be seen as an extreme case of the time lag between undertaking and performance."). Operationalizing the treaty variable this way has the effect of magnifying changes in country practices over time, whether positive or negative. See infra note 298.
280. I use ordered probit analysis here because the dependent variable data are ordinal. See TIM FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAL MODELS 37 (1994). The drawback of using this model, however, is that the coefficients are not as easily interpreted. See id. at 37-47; see also WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000). Although the coefficients from an ordered probit analysis are indicative of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (as they can, for instance, with the ordinary least squares model). To discern the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, additional calculations are required. Greene explains: In the general case, relative to the signs of the coefficients, only the signs of the changes in Prob(y = 0) and Prob(y = J) are unambiguous! The upshot is that we must be very careful in interpreting the coefficients in th[e] [ordered probit] model. . . . Indeed, without a fair amount of extra calculation, it is quite unclear how the coefficients in the ordered probit model should be interpreted. GREENE, supra, at 877-78.
281. I use ordered probit analysis here because the dependent variable data are ordinal. See TIM FUTING LIAO, INTERPRETING PROBABILITY MODELS: LOGIT, PROBIT, AND OTHER GENERALIZED LINEAL MODELS 37 (1994). The drawback of using this model, however, is that the coefficients are not as easily interpreted. See id. at 37-47; see also WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000). Although the coefficients from an ordered probit analysis are indicative of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (as they can, for instance, with the ordinary least squares model). To discern the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, additional calculations are required. Greene explains: In the general case, relative to the signs of the coefficients, only the signs of the changes in Prob(y = 0) and Prob(y = J) are unambiguous! The upshot is that we must be very careful in interpreting the coefficients in th[e] [ordered probit] model. . . . Indeed, without a fair amount of extra calculation, it is quite unclear how the coefficients in the ordered probit model should be interpreted. GREENE, supra, at 877-78.
282. Because Men in Parliament is a percentage bounded between 0 and 1, a tobit model is arguably more appropriate here. J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 212-13 (1997). However, the tobit model yields the same results for the purposes of this Article as the ordinary least squares (OLS) model, which yields coefficients that are more easily interpreted. The coefficient for ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women using either a two-limit or a right-censored tobit model is -0.00005, with a standard error of 0.00006. The coefficient is not statistically significant. The coefficient for ratification of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women by fully democratic countries using either tobit model is -0.0004, with a standard error of 0.0001. It is statistically significant at the 99% level.
283. Linda Camp Keith takes a similar approach to an analysis of the relationship between ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and countries' human rights practices. Although Keith uses a somewhat different model (she employs ordinary least squares), her results for this treaty are quite similar to mine. Keith, supra note 2, at 110-12.
284. There are several potential concerns regarding the statistical analysis below, including most notably selection bias, measurement error, and lack of mutual independence of the units. I discuss selection bias and systematic measurement error, both of which can bias results, in more depth infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text. The assumption of mutual independence of the units can also be a problem with analyses of pooled cross-sectional data (here, the data set includes multiple years for single countries). Scholars have proposed various correctives, but each has its weaknesses. See Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 304, 309 (1994); James Stimson, Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 914, 945 (1985). My use of a dummy variable for each country and a lagged dependent variable should partially address the mutual independence problem, see Fiorina, supra, at 309, though it is impossible to rule out the possibility that there is some remaining effect on the statistical significance of the coefficients.
285. Hence, I limited the database to members of the OAS for the analyses involving American treaties, to members of the OAU for analyses involving African treaties, and to members of the COE for analyses involving European treaties.
286. See infra Appendix B, Section M (explaining the reasons for including country dummies in the analyses).
287. In the analysis of the European Convention on Human Rights, the coefficient for "new regime" is significant and negative, suggesting that new regimes provide fairer trials than would otherwise be expected given other country characteristics. Similarly, in the analysis for the African Charter on Human Rights, the coefficients for "international war" and "state failure" are significant and negative, suggesting that countries engaging in war and experiencing state failure provide fairer trials than would otherwise be expected. These results may be due to the difficulties presented to the State Department, which constructs the Country Reports on Human Rights from which I drew the index, in obtaining information on the fair trial practices of countries during times of upheaval (such as war and regime transition), and its practice of giving the benefit of the doubt to newer regimes in compiling the reports.
288. In the analysis of the European Convention on Human Rights, the coefficient for international war is significant and negative (indicating that it is associated with better Civil Liberty ratings) and the coefficient for aid dependency is significant and positive (indicating that it is associated with worse Civil Liberty ratings).
289. This variable is created by interacting the treaty variable with a new dummy variable that indicates 1 only where the country's democracy rating is 10 and 0 elsewhere. In addition, I added the new dummy variable labeled "full democracy" in Table 10 as a separate independent variable to ensure that the results for the interacted variable would accurately reflect only the impact of treaty ratification for fully democratic countries.
290. These results may initially appear to contradict the findings summarized in Figure 2, which show ratification rates of the Torture Convention for full democracies initially rising and then falling off precipitously as Torture ratings rise, suggesting that for full democracies, worse practices are associated with lower, not higher, ratification rates. But what Figure 2 does not show is that the number of countries in each category is lower as Torture ratings rise, with 226 observations for a 1, 142 for a 2, and 55 for a 3. The analysis summarized in Table 5 treats each observation equally, thus the higher ratification rate for countries with a rating of 2 than for those with a 1 has a large impact on the results, as does controlling for a variety of other factors that influence human rights practices.
291. Only the Genocide Convention shows significant and negative results for the larger group of democratic nations (suggesting that practices of ratifying countries are better than otherwise predicted). In every other case, the results are either not significant or are significant and positive (suggesting worse practices for democratic ratifying countries). For the Genocide Convention the coefficient for the interacted variable is -0.034 (significant at the 95% level), and the standard error is 0.013. For the Torture Convention, the coefficient for the interacted variable is -0.030 (not significant), and the standard error is 0.036. For Article 21, the coefficient for the interacted treaty variable is 0.017 (not significant), and the standard error is 0.061. For the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (with Fair Trial as the dependent variable), the coefficient is 0.052 (not significant), and the standard error is 0.031. For the Optional Protocol (with Fair Trial as the dependent variable), the coefficient for the interacted variable is 0.075 (significant at the 95% level), and the standard error is 0.036. For the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (with Civil Liberty as the dependent variable), the coefficient for the interacted variable is -0.010 (not significant), and the standard error is 0.010. For the Optional Protocol (with Civil Liberty as the dependent variable), the coefficient for the interacted variable is 0.029 (significant at the 95% level) and the standard error is 0.013. For the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, the coefficient for the interacted variable is 0.0001 (not significant), and the standard error is 0.0002.
292. See Table 1, supra Section II.B (comparing the mean rating for countries that have ratified treaties to the mean rating of those that have not).
293. This is revealed most strikingly by Figures 1-5, supra Section II.B, which show that countries with the worst human rights ratings often have very high rates of treaty ratification.
294. See Tables 3-4, supra.
295. Most notably, as Table 3, supra, shows, ratification of the Genocide and Torture Conventions is associated with statistically significantly worse Genocide and Torture ratings. Ratification of the other universal treaties, on the other hand, has no statistically significant relationship to human rights ratings.
296. See Table 1 and Figures 2-4, supra Section II.B.
297. The analyses summarized in Tables 3-5, supra, suggest that countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol and Article 21 have no better practices than would otherwise be expected, and indeed ratification of Article 21 by fully democratic countries is associated with worse Torture ratings.
298. The comparison of means in Table 1, supra Section II.B, for example, indicates that countries that ratify the regional treaties that address torture and fair trial practices generally have worse average ratings than those that do not. Figures 2-4, supra Section II.B, show that, in the torture, fair trial, and civil liberty areas, poor human rights ratings are associated with high rates of ratification of regional human rights treaties. And the statistical analyses summarized in Table 4, supra, indicate that many of the regional treaties analyzed are associated with worse, rather than better, human rights ratings than otherwise expected.
299. Although the mean human rights ratings of full democracies that have ratified are not substantially different from the ratings of those that have not, see Table 2, supra Section II.B, the means are better across the board for full democracies. In part because full democracies do not tend to engage in the worst human rights violations, they do not tend to have high rates of ratification associated with poor ratings. See Figures 2-4, supra Section II.B. Most strikingly, full democracies appear to be more likely to improve their practices when they ratify universal treaties than is the group of nations as a whole, as the results summarized in Table 5, supra, suggest.
300. First, the uniformity of the results across different subject areas evaluated with different sources of data suggests that a reporting effect is unlikely to be the source of the counterintuitive finding. Second, and more important, in the instances in which I can directly evaluate the impact of ratification on the evaluation of human rights practices - in my coding of the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights - I find that when treaty ratification is noted, the reports almost universally appear to give countries lighter, rather than heavier, scrutiny for the year of ratification and for a short period thereafter. In essence, the reports appear to give newly ratifying countries the benefit of the doubt in the immediate wake of treaty ratification. If this observation is correct, this would suggest that the results understate, rather than overstate, the association of treaty ratification with worse human rights practices. And finally, if the results were due to greater reporting of violations in the wake of treaty ratification, we would expect to find that ratification would always or nearly always be associated with higher violation ratings. But instead the results suggest that the association between ratification and practices is strongest in the most entrenched areas of human rights and for regional treaties - variations that are difficult to explain by sole reference to a reporting effect.
301. There are statistical methods for addressing selection bias, but using them would require identifying an instrumental variable for the human rights practice that is uncorrelated with the probability of ratification - something I have thus far been unable to do. See Joshua D. Angrist et al., Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables, 91 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 444 (1996).
302. Even if newer democracies have worse practices than established democracies and are more likely to join human rights treaties more readily than are established democracies, this selection effect would likely not explain the results reported here. Cf. supra note 184. The analyses in this Section, unlike those in the previous Section, test for whether practices are better or worse than they otherwise would have been, given other country characteristics (including level of democracy and whether the regime is new or not).
303. See MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 12 (1977) ("In Himmelstrand's terms, political acts are both instrumental and expressive.").
304. I am grateful to Douglass Cassel for immensely thoughtful comments on this topic.
305. This resistance to change might even loosely be called "path-dependent." See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). Chayes and Chayes refer to this resistance to change in the human rights area as a "time lag." See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 16.
306. See Tables 8-10, infra Appendix C.
307. For example, my examination of the years in which the Fair Trial coding changed by two points or more from the previous year reveals that the most common easily discernable reason for changes in ratings is a change in government, usually from democracy to nondemocracy or vice versa.
308. See ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 145-69 (1994) (describing the "rise of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie").
309. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
310. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
311. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
312. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
313. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
314. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
315. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
316. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
317. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
318. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
319. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
320. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
321. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
322. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
323. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Dan H. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039 (1999); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022 (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 33-37 (1993) (discussing expressive norms); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968) (arguing that one of the functions of criminal law is to express social judgments); ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993) (discussing the "symbolic utility" that arises out of symbolic meaning); Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000) (providing a critique of some variants of expressive theory); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) (discussing an expressive theory of retribution).
324. McAdams, supra note 222, at 1650-51.
325. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 222, at 762.
326. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 222, at 1504.
327. This aspect of the expressive function is similar to the broad conception of the expressive function of law outlined by Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 222, at 2024-25 ("In this Article I explore the expressive function of law - the function of law in 'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly. I do so by focusing on the particular issue of how legal 'statements' might be designed to change social norms.").
328. This is a very slight twist on the definition of the term used by David Mayhew. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61 (1974).
329. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); MAYHEW, supra note 227, at 61-73 (discussing the phenomenon of "position taking" in the U.S. Congress).
330. The threat, even if small, that a country's noncompliance may be exposed may be of greater significance to some countries than to others. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
331. MAYHEW, supra note 227, at 132. Again, David Mayhew is speaking here of the U.S. Congress, rather than the international treaty system, but the insight is nonetheless instructive.
332. Id. at 132-33. This, Mayhew claims, helps explain why the early Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, which benefited nonvoting Southern blacks but were passed to please Northern audiences, achieved little progress. Id. at 133. Mayhew notes that the same cannot be said for the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. See id. at 133 n.106.
333. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
334. See Henkin, supra note 48, at 253. Henkin states: [T]he real beneficiaries [of human rights obligations] are not the State promisees but the inhabitants of the promisor State, and, in general, States - even if they have adhered to international agreements - do not have a strong interest in human rights generally, and are not yet politically acclimated and habituated to responding to violations of rights of persons abroad other than their own nationals. Id. (citation omitted).
335. That is not to say that they play no role in improving human rights. Cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2001) (arguing that "[e]conomic sanctions are an important weapon in transnational efforts to promote respect for fundamental rights and can have substantial behavior-modifying potential").
336. Henkin, supra note 48, at 253.
337. For clear descriptions and assessments of the intergovernmental human rights enforcement system, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 592-704; and THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
338. See supra note 101.
339. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, First Report of the Committee, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 336 (James Crawford & Michael Byers eds., 1996) (identifying the major deficiencies in the human rights treaty system and issuing recommendations for improving it); Rudolf Geiger, The Violation of Reporting Obligations and the General Rules of State Responsibility, in THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS 139, 139 (Eckart Klein ed., 1996) ("The rules of procedure of the treaty bodies provide for certain steps to be taken in order to induce a State to comply with its reporting duty. Such procedural steps may consist of a formal reminder by the treaty organ to the dilatory State or of a report to a superior organ (like the ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly). There are, however, no provisions covering the case should these measures fail."). For an excellent overview of many of the central debates regarding human rights treaty monitoring, see THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1998) (describing and assessing the UN human rights system); HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987) (offering a history and assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
340. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, First Report of the Committee, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 336 (James Crawford & Michael Byers eds., 1996) (identifying the major deficiencies in the human rights treaty system and issuing recommendations for improving it); Rudolf Geiger, The Violation of Reporting Obligations and the General Rules of State Responsibility, in THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS 139, 139 (Eckart Klein ed., 1996) ("The rules of procedure of the treaty bodies provide for certain steps to be taken in order to induce a State to comply with its reporting duty. Such procedural steps may consist of a formal reminder by the treaty organ to the dilatory State or of a report to a superior organ (like the ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly). There are, however, no provisions covering the case should these measures fail."). For an excellent overview of many of the central debates regarding human rights treaty monitoring, see THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1998) (describing and assessing the UN human rights system); HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987) (offering a history and assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
341. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, First Report of the Committee, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 336 (James Crawford & Michael Byers eds., 1996) (identifying the major deficiencies in the human rights treaty system and issuing recommendations for improving it); Rudolf Geiger, The Violation of Reporting Obligations and the General Rules of State Responsibility, in THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS 139, 139 (Eckart Klein ed., 1996) ("The rules of procedure of the treaty bodies provide for certain steps to be taken in order to induce a State to comply with its reporting duty. Such procedural steps may consist of a formal reminder by the treaty organ to the dilatory State or of a report to a superior organ (like the ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly). There are, however, no provisions covering the case should these measures fail."). For an excellent overview of many of the central debates regarding human rights treaty monitoring, see THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1998) (describing and assessing the UN human rights system); HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987) (offering a history and assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
342. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, First Report of the Committee, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 336 (James Crawford & Michael Byers eds., 1996) (identifying the major deficiencies in the human rights treaty system and issuing recommendations for improving it); Rudolf Geiger, The Violation of Reporting Obligations and the General Rules of State Responsibility, in THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS 139, 139 (Eckart Klein ed., 1996) ("The rules of procedure of the treaty bodies provide for certain steps to be taken in order to induce a State to comply with its reporting duty. Such procedural steps may consist of a formal reminder by the treaty organ to the dilatory State or of a report to a superior organ (like the ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly). There are, however, no provisions covering the case should these measures fail."). For an excellent overview of many of the central debates regarding human rights treaty monitoring, see THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1998) (describing and assessing the UN human rights system); HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987) (offering a history and assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
343. Comm. on Int'l Human Rights Law & Practice, First Report of the Committee, in INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI, FINLAND 336 (James Crawford & Michael Byers eds., 1996) (identifying the major deficiencies in the human rights treaty system and issuing recommendations for improving it); Rudolf Geiger, The Violation of Reporting Obligations and the General Rules of State Responsibility, in THE MONITORING SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY OBLIGATIONS 139, 139 (Eckart Klein ed., 1996) ("The rules of procedure of the treaty bodies provide for certain steps to be taken in order to induce a State to comply with its reporting duty. Such procedural steps may consist of a formal reminder by the treaty organ to the dilatory State or of a report to a superior organ (like the ECOSOC or the UN General Assembly). There are, however, no provisions covering the case should these measures fail."). For an excellent overview of many of the central debates regarding human rights treaty monitoring, see THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also PATRICK JAMES FLOOD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (1998) (describing and assessing the UN human rights system); HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987) (offering a history and assessment of the UN Commission on Human Rights).
344. Addressing this problem is a central mission of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Yet even together, they cannot monitor country compliance with each and every human rights treaty, nor do they attempt to do so. For more on fact-finding functions of international monitors, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 602-10; and THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 63-136 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
345. Addressing this problem is a central mission of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Yet even together, they cannot monitor country compliance with each and every human rights treaty, nor do they attempt to do so. For more on fact-finding functions of international monitors, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 602-10; and THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 63-136 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
346. Of course, the opposite may be true. It is possible that governments or members of governments that wish to resist deeper trade or political relationships with nations suspected of engaging in human rights violations may use a poor human rights record as an excuse for resisting deeper engagement.
347. This argument parallels that made by Mayhew regarding the U.S. Congress: "If the gratified receive muddled feedback on programmatic accomplishment, the actual supplying of the prescribed benefits becomes a distinctly secondary congressional concern." MAYHEW, supra note 227, at 132. Mayhew, in turn, was strongly influenced by GORDON TULLOCK, Information Without Profit, in PAPERS ON NON-MARKET DECISION-MAKING 141 (Gordon Tullock ed., 1967).
348. In this sense, human rights treaties might be viewed as an example of the claim by Giulio M. Gallarotti that international organization (IO) can lead to adverse substitution. He explains: Nations are continually faced with difficult domestic and international problems whose resolution entails political, economic, or social costs. Although IO can alleviate short-run pressures and provide nations with an "out" from more costly solutions, doing so can be counterproductive in that it discourages nations from seeking more substantive and longer-term resolutions to their problems. Giulio M Gallarotti, The Limits of International Organizations: Systemic Failure in the Management of International Relations, 45 INT'L ORG. 198, 199 (1991). Gallarotti notes as support for this contention a statement by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar that "[t]here is a tendency in the United Nations for governments to act as though passage of a resolution absolved them from further responsibility for the subject in question." Id. at 200 (quoting Pérez de Cuéllar).
349. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
350. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
351. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
352. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
353. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
354. Some scholars look to moral psychology, arguing that human rights ideals are intuitively attractive to human beings and recognized worldwide as valid. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Sikkink, supra note 83. Others argue that cultural homogeneity is an important source of human rights agreements because states that share a common history, religion, cultural tradition, and values are more likely to agree upon human rights provisions. PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (1983); Nisuke Ando, The Future of Monitoring Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of the Human Rights Committee, in CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1991-1992, at 169, 171-72 (1992); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 638 (1986). Yet others offer historical explanations for the appeal of human rights. ANDREW DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW 220 (1983); John H. Whitfield, How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 31 (1988). Regardless of the source to which they point, however, they all agree on one fundamental point: Human rights have an appeal that generates genuine commitment.
355. See Moravcsik, supra note 25.
356. This would entail something of a reversal of the relationship described by Robert D. Putnam in his seminal article, Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988). This reversal is further explored in my work in progress on human rights treaty formation. See Hathaway, supra note 68.
357. A.W. Brian Simpson points to this difficulty in the context of British compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. See SIMPSON, supra note 9.
358. This situation is unlike the used car context analyzed in George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). Akerlof argued that due to quality uncertainty in the used car market, good used cars may no longer be sold. Id. In the treaty ratification context, however, the cost of the good to the "seller" has an inverse relationship to the quality of the "good." That is, the cost of ratification is likely lower for many of the countries that intend to comply with the requirements of the treaty. Thus, the discounting of the expressive benefit does not lead such countries to stop "selling" the good product (i.e. ratifying the treaties with the intention of actually complying with them).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
360. See infra note 256.
361. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals (Nov. 2, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
362. Id. at 1-8.
363. Id. at 15-18.
364. Id. at 23-26.
365. The adoption of a constitution no more guarantees that the rights defined therein will be enforced than does the adoption of a treaty. Many countries have good laws and constitutions that are not enforced. As Ann and Robert Seidman have spent decades demonstrating, this is not mere coincidence. ANN SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE (2001) (providing a guide for legislative drafting that demonstrates how to write enforceable laws).
366. Signaling arguments generally assume that in order for an act to carry a signaling effect, it must entail real costs. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2000) ("Signals reveal type if only the good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone know this.");
367. Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Principled Behabior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185 (1998) (exploring the difference between actors' public representations and their actual behavior); see also Simmons, supra note 4, at 324 (arguing that states submit to International Monetay Fund obligations as a "signaling device . . . to convince privat market actors as well as other governments of a serious intent to eschew the procribed behavior," and thereby obtain "benefits of good standing in the international economic community"). Because I claim that countries that ratify treaties need not intend to carry out the requirements of the treaty, ratification would appear not meet this condition. Assuming, however, that ratification does entail cost for some actors - those that actually do carry out a treaty's terms - and because it is difficult or impossible to distinguish these actors from those for whom ratification is virtually costless, ratification continues to issue a message, though perhaps not a signal as this literature would usually define it.
368. Conversely, countries with good practices and good reputations may be more reluctant to join treaties with which they are not certain they will be able to comply. Indeed, this may partially explain the United States's reluctance to join international human rights treaties, It may be highly risk-averse to being identified as failing to comply with human rights treaties to which it has committed. This dynamic will be explored further in a work in progress. See Hathaway, supra note 68.
369. See sources cited supra note 120.
370. This argument provides an interesting twist on Thomas Franck's claim that "symbolic validation" is an important determinant of legitimacy and hence of whether a law will be met with compliance. See FRANCK, supra note 87, at 34-38. Although the characteristics that indicate symbolic validation - including ritual and pedigree - may lead countries to conform their practices to the principle that is validated, treaties possessing these characteristics are not necessarily more likely to enjoy high rates of compliance. Indeed, the argument of this Article is that the opposite may be true: Countries may be more likely to use such treaties to offset preexisting pressure for change in practices.
371. Optional Protocol, supra note 163, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. at 302.
372. Torture Convention, supra note 51, art. 21, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 26, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 118-20.
373. Id. art. 22, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 27, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 120.
374. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 740-41 (providing an overview of the current status of the individual complaint procedure under the Optional Protocol and noting that although the Committee had requested follow-up information with respect to the 253 cases in which it had found violations, it had received information with regard to only 152 of these cases); Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 238, at 15, 33 (noting that the current capacity of the Human Rights Committee offers "slender support for the rule of law").
375. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 101, at 777.
376. Id. at 776 (noting that no interstate complaint has ever been brought under any of the UN treaty-body procedures).
377. See Table 3, supra Section II.C. Indeed, ratification of the Optional Protocol by full democracies is associated with better Civil Liberty ratings than expected. See Table 5, supra Section II.C.
378. See Table 3, supra Section II.C. The evidence is not unambiguously positive, however, as ratification of Article 21 by full democracies is associated with worse Torture ratings than expected. See Table 5, supra Section II.C.
379. See Figures 2-4, supra Section II.B.
380. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 27.
381. Id. (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 183 (1993)).
382. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 832.
383. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, ch. VIII, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 157-60 (establishing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); id. art. 62, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159 (providing that the Court has jurisdiction only if the state party whose conduct is at issue has entered into a special agreement or declared that it recognizes as binding, ipso facto, the jurisdiction of the Court on matters relating to interpretation of the Convention); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, § 2, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234 (establishing the European Court of Human Rights).
384. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 141, art. 45, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 155 (providing that states must make an additional declaration accepting the competence of the Commission to hear allegations by another state party against them); id. art. 44, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 155 (providing that any person or group of persons or any legally recognized nongovernmental entity may lodge a petition with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints of a violation by a state party); European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 67, art. 24, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236 (providing that any party to the Convention may refer to the Commission any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention by any other party); id. art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236 (permitting individual applications to the Commission from any person, nongovernmental organization, or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by a state party).
385. See Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz, Preface to FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE; THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950-2000, at ix, ix (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001) (providing a "detailed study of the practical effect of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] upon and within the domestic legal and governmental systems of thirty-two of its member countries"). Perhaps the best-known example (at least in the United States) of a European Court of Human Rights case that precipitated a change in the domestic policy of a European Union member is Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31417/96, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 572-87 (1999), which held that the discharge of two British nationals from the Royal Navy on the sole ground that they were homosexual violated Article 8 of the European Convention. Less than a year after the decision was rendered, the U.K. began permitting persons who are openly homosexual to serve in the British Armed Services. See T.R. Reid, British Military Lifts Restrictions on Gays, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 13, 2000, at 14A.
386. See Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz, Preface to FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE; THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS MEMBER STATES, 1950- 2000, at ix, ix (Robert Blackburn & Jorg Polakiewicz eds., 2001) (providing a "detailed study of the practical effect of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] upon and within the domestic legal and governmental systems of thirty-two of its member countries"). Perhaps the best-known example (at least in the United States) of a European Court of Human Rights case that precipitated a change in the domestic policy of a European Union member is Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. No. 31417/96, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 548, 572-87 (1999), which held that the discharge of two British nationals from the Royal Navy on the sole ground that they were homosexual violated Article 8 of the European Convention. Less than a year after the decision was rendered, the U.K. began permitting persons who are openly homosexual to serve in the British Armed Services. See T.R. Reid, British Military Lifts Restrictions on Gays, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 13, 2000, at 14A.
387. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 (entered into force May 1, 1999) [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty]. The Amsterdam Treaty amended the Treaty on European Union Article 49 (formerly Article O) to require new member states to demonstrate respect for the principles of Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union in order to accede to the Union. See Treaty on European Union, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 49, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145 [hereinafter Treaty on European Union]. The Amsterdam Treaty also amended the Treaty on European Union to establish a procedure whereby some membership rights in the EU can be suspended if a "serious and persistent breach" of human rights is found in a member state. Treaty on European Union, supra, art. 7, 1997 O.J. (C 340) at 154.
388. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 252, on file with author) (noting that in 1993, the European Council decided at Copenhagen that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities"); Andrew Williams, Enlargement of the Union and Human Rights Conditionality: A Policy of Distinction?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 601, 602 (2000) ("Prior to . . . the 1980s, there was little evidence of an explicit human rights conditionality applied to potential members of the European Union. However, as entry was possible only through the unanimous approval of all the existing Member States, it was perhaps clear that any applicant for membership had to ascribe to the fundamental principles of the Union which since at least the early 1970s had included respect for human rights." (footnotes omitted)). For example, Turkey's bid to join the EU was rejected in 1997, in part because of its poor human rights record. See Stephen Kinzer, Europeans Shut the Door on Turkey's Membership in Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A13 (quoting the German Foreign Minister as stating that Turkey did not qualify for membership because of its record on "human rights, the Kurdish question, relations with Greece and of course very clear economic questions"). Indeed, since 1998, the European Commission has begun producing reports on the progress of applicant nations toward accession in which they detail, among other things, the human rights records of the applicants. Tellingly, the section of the report that covers human rights always begins with an overview of the human rights treaties that the applicant country has ratified. It then details relevant changes in the country in the last year, focusing largely on legal changes and less on actual state practices. See Comm'n on Progress Towards Accession, Progress Reports (Oct. 13, 1999), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/index.htm.
389. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 252, on file with author) (noting that in 1993, the European Council decided at Copenhagen that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities"); Andrew Williams, Enlargement of the Union and Human Rights Conditionality: A Policy of Distinction?, 25 EUR. L. REV. 601, 602 (2000) ("Prior to . . . the 1980s, there was little evidence of an explicit human rights conditionality applied to potential members of the European Union. However, as entry was possible only through the unanimous approval of all the existing Member States, it was perhaps clear that any applicant for membership had to ascribe to the fundamental principles of the Union which since at least the early 1970s had included respect for human rights." (footnotes omitted)). For example, Turkey's bid to join the EU was rejected in 1997, in part because of its poor human rights record. See Stephen Kinzer, Europeans Shut the Door on Turkey's Membership in Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at A13 (quoting the German Foreign Minister as stating that Turkey did not qualify for membership because of its record on "human rights, the Kurdish question, relations with Greece and of course very clear economic questions"). Indeed, since 1998, the European Commission has begun producing reports on the progress of applicant nations toward accession in which they detail, among other things, the human rights records of the applicants. Tellingly, the section of the report that covers human rights always begins with an overview of the human rights treaties that the applicant country has ratified. It then details relevant changes in the country in the last year, focusing largely on legal changes and less on actual state practices. See Comm'n on Progress Towards Accession, Progress Reports (Oct. 13, 1999), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/index.htm.
390. The Statute of the Council of Europe now effectively requires states to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights as a condition of membership in the Council. The Statute of the Council of Europe provides that "[e]very Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106. Accession to the Council therefore may often require countries to enact legislative changes (for example, abolish the death penalty) and satisfy experts operating on behalf of the Council that the country meets minimum human rights standards.
391. See Charter of the Organization of American States, as Amended by the Protocols of Buenos Aires and Cartagena De Indias; the Protocol of Amendment of Washington; and the Protocol of Amendment of Managua, June 10, 1993, art. 4, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-22 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 981, 990 ("All American States that ratify the present Charter are Members of the Organization.").
392. See id. art. 3, § k, 33 I.L.M. at 990 ("The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex."); id. art. 3, § i, 33 I.L.M. at 990 ("Social justice and social security are bases of lasting peace."); id. art. 44, 33 I.L.M. at 994 (enumerating various human rights that member states are expected to observe and respect); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 26 (1982).
393. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (making virtually no mention of human rights); id. arts. I, IV, 479 U.N.T.S. at 72, 74 (stating that membership in the OAU is open to all "independent sovereign African State[s]").
394. See Table 4, supra Section II.C.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
396. One might hypothesize that democracies are less likely to ratify treaties and then fail to comply with them because democracies are simply less likely to ratify treaties in general, largely because democratic institutions create significant barriers to ratification. The assumption upon which this hypothesis rests, however, may not be entirely accurate: As Figures 1-5, supra Section II.B, demonstrate, democracies are often more, rather than less, likely to ratify human rights treaties than the group of countries as a whole.
397. Cassel posits a similar process. See Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, supra note 2, at 122 ("Over time, the extent to which international law serves as a useful tool for protection of human rights will depend mainly on its contribution to a broader set of transnational processes that affect the ways people think and institutions behave . . . .").
398. This may be true in part because the data on practices rarely predate the opening of the relevant treaties for signature. If the creation of human rights treaties has a positive impact on discourse, this impact is probably concentrated in the years immediately before and perhaps immediately after they open for signature, years that the data set may not cover.
399. See Koh, Bringing International Law Home, supra note 102, at 642-63, 646 (discussing the role of norm entrepreneurs in the process of internalization); see also Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, supra note 2, at 122 ("International human rights law also facilitates international and transnational processes that reinforce, stimulate, and monitor these domestic dialogues."); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 1, 5 (arguing that transnational advocacy networks "empower and legitimate the claims of domestic opposition groups against norm-violating governments").
400. For an interesting examination of monitoring of international treaties, see ADMINISTRATIVE AND EXPERT MONITORING OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (Paul C. Szasz ed., 1999).
401. See supra note 101.
402. See, e.g., BAYEFSKY, supra note 101 (examining ways to improve the UN reporting system, in an exhaustive report on the UN human rights treaty system); THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 238; Alston, supra note 101, ¶¶ 37-79; Dinah Po Kempner, Making Treaty Bodies Work: An Activist Perspective, in AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, supra note 2, at 475 (making similar proposals for reform to the UN human rights treaty system from an activist's perspective).
403. The policy has been adopted by the United Nations and advocated most prominently by Philip Alston, acting as an independent expert appointed by the Secretary General. See Alston, supra note 101, ¶¶ 14-36 ("Universal ratification of the six core United Nations human rights treaties would establish the best possible foundation for international endeavors to promote respect for human rights.").
404. This would not be entirely unlike the procedure used by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which requires members to apply for membership and grants accession "on terms to be agreed" between the acceding government and the WTO. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XII, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1150 (1994).
405. Indeed, in many respects, the problem of international human rights treaty compliance can be seen as a specific instance of the broader challenge of translating law into social change. This insight is the foundation of decades of work by Ann and Robert Seidman, who have demonstrated that the mere passage of laws guaranteeing rights, without more, is not enough to make those rights reality. See, e.g., SEIDMAN ET AL., supra note 254.
406. This is a function that Chayes and Chayes refer to as "capacity-building." CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 25.
407. See sources cited supra note 185.
408. This strategy of compiling hypotheses is outlined in HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., THEORY CONSTRUCTION: FROM VERBAL TO MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS (1969), and it is employed in Poe et al., supra note 185, at 292.
409. I discuss in greater detail the rationale behind the expectation that these variables will influence countries' human rights policies and the implications of empirical findings regarding their influence on countries' human rights practices in Oona A. Hathaway, Political and Economic Influences on Human Rights Practices: An Empirical Analysis (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
410. United Nations Treaty Collection, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
411. Org. of Afr. Unity, Status of Ratification, at http://www.up.ac.za/chr/ahrdb/ ahrdb_statorat.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); Org. of Am. States, Inter-American Treaties Approved Within the Framework of the OAS, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); Council of Eur., at http://www.coe.int (last visited Apr. 2, 2002); Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Convention Against Torture, Statistical Survey of Individual Complaints Dealt with by the Committee Against Torture (Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/stat3.htm.
412. Constructing the variables this way has the effect of magnifying changes in country ratings over time, whether positive or negative - which, as I argue in Part II, is appropriate given the expectation that treaties will have gradual and cumulative effects on country practices. When I instead operationalize the treaty variables as 0-1 indicators, I find, as expected many fewer statistically significant results, though all the results that remain significant are significant in the same direction. The coefficients for the Genocide Convention and Torture Convention reported in Table 8 are insignificant when the treaty variable is operationalized as a 0-1 indicator. Similarly, the coefficients for all the regional treaties except the African Charter on Human Rights (without country dummies, with Torture as the dependent variable) are insignificant when I use a 0-1 treaty indicator. (The African Charter shows a coefficient of 0.330, with a standard error of 0.125, which is significant at the 99% level.) For full democracies, the coefficients for Article 21 and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women are insignificant when I use a 0-1 treaty indicator. The coefficients for the Genocide Convention for full democracies (-1.096, with a standard error of 0.381) and for the Torture Convention for full democracies (0.650, with a standard error of 0.235) are significant at the 99% level in the same direction as with a summed treaty variable. I was unable to obtain convergence for ratification of the remaining treaties by full democracies. In only one instance do I find a statistically significant result with a 0-1 indicator that I do not find with a summed treaty variable. When I analyze the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (for the group of countries as a whole) with the treaty variable as a 0-1 indicator, I find positive statistically significant results. (The coefficient is 0.331, the standard error is 0.096, and the level of statistical significance is 99%.) Thus operationalizing the treaty variable as a 0-1 indicator also suggests (albeit more weakly) that with the exception of fully democratic nations, ratification of human rights treaties by countries is often associated with worse ratings than would otherwise be expected.
413. See Monty G. Marshall, Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-1999 (Oct. 1, 2000), at http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/warlist.htm.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. For more on the coding scheme of the CSP database, see Center for Systemic Peace, Assessing the Societal and Systemic Impact of Warfare: Coding Guidelines, at http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/warcode.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
417. Marshall, supra note 299.
418. Id.
419. See supra text accompanying note 302.
420. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (World Bank CD-ROM, 2000).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2000, at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/ index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (including a description of variables and a link to the data set).
424. See, e.g., JOHN D. MAY, OF THE CONDITIONS AND MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY (1973) (cataloguing and critiquing several prior efforts at measuring democracy); ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY (Alex Inkeles ed., 1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges inherent in measuring democracy); Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371-77 (1980) (discussing the controversial aspects and limitations of the then-commonly-used indices of democracy and proposing a revised index of democracy); Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207, 1208-10 (1993) (examining the definition and measurement of liberal democracy).
425. See, e.g., JOHN D. MAY, OF THE CONDITIONS AND MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY (1973) (cataloguing and critiquing several prior efforts at measuring democracy); ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY (Alex Inkeles ed., 1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges inherent in measuring democracy); Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371-77 (1980) (discussing the controversial aspects and limitations of the then-commonly-used indices of democracy and proposing a revised index of democracy); Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207, 1208-10 (1993) (examining the definition and measurement of liberal democracy).
426. See, e.g., JOHN D. MAY, OF THE CONDITIONS AND MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY (1973) (cataloguing and critiquing several prior efforts at measuring democracy); ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY (Alex Inkeles ed., 1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges inherent in measuring democracy); Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371-77 (1980) (discussing the controversial aspects and limitations of the then-commonly-used indices of democracy and proposing a revised index of democracy); Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207, 1208-10 (1993) (examining the definition and measurement of liberal democracy).
427. See, e.g., JOHN D. MAY, OF THE CONDITIONS AND MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY (1973) (cataloguing and critiquing several prior efforts at measuring democracy); ON MEASURING DEMOCRACY (Alex Inkeles ed., 1991) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the challenges inherent in measuring democracy); Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 371-77 (1980) (discussing the controversial aspects and limitations of the then-commonly-used indices of democracy and proposing a revised index of democracy); Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1207, 1208-10 (1993) (examining the definition and measurement of liberal democracy).
428. Marshall & Jaggers, supra note 309.
429. Polity IV Dataset Variables List, at www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
430. Id.
431. WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, supra note 306.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Polity IV Dataset Variables List, supra note 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
440. Marshall & Jaggers, supra note 309.
441. PAUL NEWBOLD, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 692 (4th ed. 1995).
442. CHRISTOPHER DOUGHERTY, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRICS 183-84 (1992) An alternative approach would have been to include dummy variables for each year. I chose not to do so not only because this would have taken up 39 additional degrees of freedom, but also because the results would not have detected consistent change in the dependent variable over time. Moreover, worldwide events that are likely to affect human rights practices (such as widespread war, worldwide economic downturn, or the like) are addressed in substantial part by the inclusion of control variables that measure these events more directly.
443. JACK JOHNSTON & JOHN DINARDO, ECONOMETRIC METHODS 52-53 (4th ed. 1997).
444. See Christian Davenport, Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Rrepression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 683, 698-99 (1995); Poe et al., supra note 185, at 306.
445. The results for the treaty variables are statistically significant in the same direction both with and without the lagged dependent variable with only a few exceptions. The coefficient for the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (for the group of countries as a whole) is negative and significant at the 99% level when I omit the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient is -0.001, with a standard error of 0.0004. The coefficient is insignificant, however, when standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country. The coefficient for the American Convention on Human Rights with the Fair Trial dependent variable is negative, but not significant, when I omit a lagged dependent variable (the coefficient is -0.266 and the standard error is 0.127). In the analyses of full democracies' practices, I find a newly significant coefficient for the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with Civil Liberty as the dependent variable (the coefficient is -0.035, the standard error is 0.013, and the significance level is 99%) when I omit lagged dependent variables.