The effect of repeated play on reputation building: An experimental approach

International Organization

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 343-365

  Tingley, Dustin H ^a   Walter, Barbara F ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956104021     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818311000026     Document Type: Article

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