Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-27

  Flores, Thomas Edward ^a   Nooruddin, Irfan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict recurrence; Economic recovery; Post conflict; World Bank

Indexed keywords

EID: 60649092317     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-008-9039-0     Document Type: Article

References (71)

1. Achen, C. (1986). Statistical analysis of quasi-experiments. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
2. Aizenman, J., & Marion, N. (1999). Volatility and investment: Interpreting evidence from developing countries. Economica, 66,157-179.
3. Babson, B. O. (2006). Visualizing a North Korean "Bold Switchover": International financial institutions and economic development in the DPRK. Asia Policy, 2,11 24, July.
4. Ball, N., & Halevy, T. (1996). Making peace work: The role of the international development community. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council.
5. Bartels, L. M. (1991). Instrumental and 'quasi-instrumental' variables. American Journal of Political Science, 35, 777-800.
6. Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998). Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science. 42(4), 1260-1288.
7. Boehmke, F. J., Morey, D. S., & Shannon, M. (2006). Selection bias and continuous-time duration models: Consequences and a proposed solution. American Journal of Political Science, 50(1), 192-207.
8. Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995). Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(430), 443-50.
9. Box-Steffensmeier, J., & Jones, B. (2004). Event history analysis. Cambridge University Press.
10. Boyce, J. K. (2004). The international financial institutions: Postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding capacities. Working paper, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
11. Boyce, J. K. (2007). Public finance, aid, and post-conflict recovery. Working paper 2007-09, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
12. Clague, C, Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1996). Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 243-276.
13. Clague, C, Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1999). Contract-intensive money: Contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance. Journal of Economic Growth, 4(2), 185-211.
14. Collier, P., & Hoe filer, A. (1998). On economic causes of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 50, 563-573.
15. Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffter, A., Reynal-Querol, M., & Sambanis, N. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. Washington, DC: World Bankand Oxford University Press.
16. Dollar, D., & Svensson, J. (2000). What explains the success or failure of structural adjustmentprogrammes? The Economic Journal, 110, 894-917.
17. Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2006). Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18. Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. (2007). Independent actor or agent? An empirical analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF conditions. Journal of Law and Economics, 50(1), 105-124.
19. Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN security council influence World Bank decisions? Journal ofDevelopment Economics (forthcoming).
20. Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1986). Bootstrap methods for standard errors, confidence intervals,and other measures of statistical accuracy. Statistical Science, 1, 54-77.
21. Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. J. (1993). An introduction to the bootstrap. London: Chapmanand Hall.
22. Flores, T. E., & Nooruddin, I. (2006). Democracy under the gun: Understanding post-conflicteconomic recovery. Manuscript, University of Michigan and Ohio State University.
23. Forman, S., & Salomons, D. (1999). Meeting essential needs in post-conflict recovery. Workingpaper, New York University Center on International Cooperation.
24. Fortna, V. P. (2004). Peace time: Cease-fire agreements and the durability of peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
25. Gartzke, E. (1998). Kant we all get along?: Opportunity, willingness, and the origins of thedemocratic peace. American Journal of Political Science, 42(1), 1-27.
26. Gartzke, E. (2000). Preferences and the democratic peace. International Studies Quarterly, 44(2),191-210.
27. Gartzke, E., & Jo, 13.-J. (2002). United Nations general assembly voting, 1946-1996. Version 3.0. http://www.columbia.edu/∼eg589/datasets.
28. Greene, W. H. (2005). Econometric analysis, (5th ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Heckman, J. J. (1997). Instrumental variables: A study of implicit behavioral assumptions used inmaking program evaluations. Journal of Human Resources, 32(3), 441-462.
29. Henisz, W. J. (2002). Politics and international investment. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
30. Jensen, N. M. (2006). Nation-states and the multinational corporation: A political economy offoreign direct investment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
31. Kapur, D., Lewis, J. P., & Webb, R. (1997). The World Bank: Its first half century. Washington,DC:Brookings Institution Press.
32. Keefer, P. (2007). Insurgency and credible commitment in autocracies and democracies. World Bank policy research working paper 4185, April.
33. Kievelitz, U., Schaef, T., Leonhardt, M., Hahn, H., & Vorwerk, S. (2004). Practical guide tomultilateral needs assessments in post-conflict situations. New York, NY, and Washington, DC: United Nations and World Bank.
34. Kreimer, A., Eriksson, J., Muscat, R., Arnold, M., & Scott, C. (1998). The World Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department.
35. Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. D. (2006). How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreignaid and bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy, 114(5), 905-930.
36. Lake, D. A. (2007). Escape from the state of nature: Authority and hierarchy in world politics.International Security, 32(1), 47-79.
37. Lefrancois, F. (2004). World Bank, IMF, and Armed conflicts and World Bank, IMF: Helpingpeace or creating conditions for war. Accessed at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org on February 17, 2007.
38. Licklider, R. (Ed.) (1993). Stopping the killing: How civil wars end. New York, London: New York University Press.
39. Licklider, R. (1995). The consequences of negotiated settlements in civil wars, 1945-1993. American Political Science Review, 89(3), 681-690.
40. Mendelson-Forman, J., & Mashatt, M. (2007). Employment generation and economic development in stabilization and reconstruction operations. United States Institute of Peace, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 6 (March). Available at http://www.usip.org/ pubs/specialreports/srs/srs6.pdf.
41. Mooney, C. Z. (1996). Bootstrap statistical inference: Examples and evaluations for political science. American Journal of Political Science, 40(2), 570-602.
42. Mooney, C. Z., & Duval, R. D. (1993). Bootstrapping: A nonparametric approach to statistical inference. Sage Paper 07-095. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.
43. Nielson, D., Tierney, M., & Weaver, C. (2006). Bridging the rationalist-constructivist divide: Re-engineering the culture of the World Bank. Journal of International Relations and Development, 9(2), 107-139.
44. Nooruddin, I. (2002). Modeling selection bias in studies of sanctions efficacy. International Interactions, 28(1), 57-74.
45. Nooruddin, I., & Simmons, J. W. (2006). The politics of hard choices: IMF programs and government spending. International Organization, 60(4), 1001-1033.
46. Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. (1977). The costs of major wars: The phoenix factor. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1347-1366.
47. Paris, R. (2004). At war's end: Building peace after civil conflict New York: Cambridge University Press.
48. Posen, B. (1993). The security dilemma in ethnic conflict. In Brown, M. (Ed.), Ethnic conflict andinternational security, (pp. 103-124).
49. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pritchett, L. (2000). Understanding patterns of economic growth: Searching for hills among plateaus, mountains, and plains. World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 221-250.
50. Quinn, J. J., & Simon, D. J. (2006). Plus ca change,...: The allocation of French ODA to Africaduring and after the cold war. International Interactions, 32, 295-318.
51. Quinn, J. M., Mason, T. D., & Gurses, M. (2007). Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence. International Interactions, 33,167 193.
52. Roberts-Schweitzer, E., Greaney, V., & Duer, K. (2006). Promoting social cohesion through education. Washington, DC: World Bank.
53. Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997). Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments.Econometrics, 65(3), 557-586.
54. Stone, R. W. (2002). Lending credibility: The international monetary fund and the post-communisttransition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
55. Svensson, J. (2003). Why conditional aid doesn't work and what can be done about it? Journal of Development Economics, 70, 381-402.
56. Thyne, C. L. (2006). ABC's, 123's, and the golden rule: The pacifying effect of education on civil war, 1980-1999. International Studies Quarterly, 50, 733-754.
57. Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
58. Walter, B. F. (1997). The critical barrier to civil war settlement. International Organization, 51(3), 335-364.
59. Walter, B. F. (1999). Designing transitions from civil war: Demobilization, democratization, and commitments to peace. International Security, 24(1), 127-155.
60. Walter, B. F. (2002). Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
61. Walter, B. F. (2004). Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war. Journal of PeaceResearch, 41(3), 371 388.
62. Weiss, M. A. (2004). World Bank post-conflict aid: Oversight issues for congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
63. Winship, C, & Morgan, S. L. (1999). The effects of causal effects from observational data. Annual Review of Sociology, 25, 659-706.
64. World Bank (2003). Post-conflict fund: Annual report-fscal year 2003. Washington, DC: World Bank.
65. World Bank (2004a). Post-conflict fund: Annual report-fiscal year 2004. Washington, DC: World Bank.
66. World Bank (2004b). Evaluation of the post-conflict fund, 2002. Washington, DC: World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group.
67. World Bank (2005a). Post-conflict fund: Annual report-fiscal year 2005. Washington, DC: World Bank.
68. World Bank (2005b). Reshaping the future: Education and postconflict reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank.
69. World Bank (2006a). World development indicators. 2006. CD-ROM. World Bank (2006b). Post-conflict fund and licus trust fund: Annual report-fiscal year 2006. Washington, DC: World Bank.
70. World Bank (2006c). Engaging with fragile states: An IEG review of World Bank support to low-income countries under stress. Washington, DC: World Bank Independent Evaluation Group.
71. World Bank (2006d). Information statement: International bank for reconstruction and development. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/debtsecurities/.