How U.S. decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957-1982

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 269-291

  McKeown, Timothy J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

"Soft" power; Archival research; Constructivist theories; Control; Declassified documents; History; Influence; Informal; Side payments; United States

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349600334     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-009-9059-4     Document Type: Article

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