Are 'New' Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries

World Development

Volumn 39, Issue 11, 2011, Pages 1950-1968

  Dreher, Axel ^a,b,c,d,e   Nunnenkamp, Peter ^f   Thiele, Rainer ^f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^b KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

^e IZA   (Germany)

^f KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Aid allocation; Donor motives; New donors; Probit; Tobit

Indexed keywords

AID FLOW; BILATERAL AGREEMENT; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INTERNATIONAL AID;

EID: 80054048319     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024     Document Type: Article

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