The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 51-61

  Kilby, Christopher ^a  

^a VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditionality; Structural adjustment; United States; World Bank

Indexed keywords

CONDITIONALITY; INTERNATIONAL AID; POLITICAL ECONOMY; STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT; WORLD BANK;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 61549097845     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.014     Document Type: Article

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