The evolution of norms

American Journal of Sociology

Volumn 10, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 1493-1545

  Bendor, Jonathan ^b   Swistak, Piotr ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035343850     PISSN: 00029602     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/321298     Document Type: Article

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