Logic, probability, and human reasoning

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2015, Pages 201-214

  Johnson Laird, P N ^a,b   Khemlani, Sangeet S ^c   Goodwin, Geoffrey P ^d  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MACHINERY; PROBABILITY;

HUMAN REASONING; LOGIC AND PROBABILITY; MENTAL MODEL; PROBABILITY LOGIC;

PROBABILISTIC LOGICS;

ASSERTIVENESS; ATHLETE; CLINICAL EVALUATION; COGNITION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DEFENSE MECHANISM; EMOTION; EXPLICIT MEMORY; HUMAN; KINEMATICS; LOGIC; MATHEMATICS; MENTAL ARITHMETIC; MENTAL CAPACITY; MENTAL FUNCTION; MORALITY; PREDICTION; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; QUANTUM MECHANICS; REASONING; REVIEW; SCIENTIST; BRAIN; PHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; THINKING;

BRAIN; HUMANS; LOGIC; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY; THINKING;

EID: 84925668201     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: 1879307X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2015.02.006     Document Type: Review

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