Causal reasoning with mental models

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Volumn 8, Issue October, 2014, Pages

  Khemlani, Sangeet S ^a   Barbey, Aron K ^b   Johnson Laird, Philip N ^c,d  

^a NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Causal reasoning; Enabling conditions; Explanations; Lateral prefrontal cortex; Mental models

Indexed keywords

BRAIN DAMAGE; CAUSAL REASONING; COGNITION; COMPREHENSION; HUMAN; LATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX; LEARNING; MENTAL MODEL; MODEL; NONHUMAN; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; REVIEW; THINKING;

EID: 84933671372     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16625161     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00849     Document Type: Review

References (129)

1. Ahn, W. (1998). Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts? The role of causal status in determining feature centrality. Cognition 69, 135-178. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(98)00063-8
2. Ahn, W., and Bailenson, J. (1996). Causal attribution as a search for underlying mechanism: an explanation of the conjunction fallacy and the discounting principle. Cogn. Psychol. 31, 82-123. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1996.0013
3. Ahn, W., andKalish, C. W. (2000). “The role ofmechanism beliefs in causal reasoning,” in Explanation and Cognition, eds F. C. Keil and R. A. Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 199-225.
4. Asaad, W. F., Rainer, G., and Miller, E. K. (1998). Neural activity in the primate prefrontal cortex during associative learning. Neuron 21, 1399-1407. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(00)80658-3
5. Badre, D. (2008). Cognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro-caudal organization of the frontal lobes. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 193-200. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.004
6. Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., and Grafman, J. (2012a). Dorsolateral prefrontal contributions to human intelligence. Neuropsychologia 51, 1361-1369. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.05.017
7. Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., and Grafman, J. (2013). Architecture of cognitive flexibility revealed by lesion mapping. Neuroimage 82, 547-554. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.087
8. Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., and Grafman, J. (2014b). Neural mechanisms of discourse comprehension: a human lesion study. Brain 137, 277-287. doi: 10.1093/brain/awt312
9. Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., Paul, E. J., and Grafman, J. (2014a). Architecture of fluid intelligence and working memory revealed by lesion mapping. Brain Struct. Funct. 219, 485-494. doi: 10.1007/s00429-013-0512-z
10. Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., Solomon, J., Krueger, F., Forbes, C., and Grafman, J. (2012b). An integrative architecture for general intelligence and executive function revealed by lesion mapping. Brain 135, 1154-1164. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws021
11. Barbey, A. K., Koenigs, M., and Grafman, J. (2011). Orbitofrontal contributions to human working memory. Cereb. Cortex 21, 789-795. doi: 10.1093/cer- cor/bhq153
12. Barbey, A. K., and Patterson, R. (2011).Architecture ofexplanatoryinference in the human prefrontal cortex. Front. Psychol. 2:162. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00162
13. Barbey, A. K., and Wolff, P. (2007). “Learning causal structure from reasoning," in Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum), 713-718.
14. Bar-Hillel, Y., and Carnap, R. (1953). Semantic information. Br. J. Philos. Sci. 4, 147-157.
15. Besnard, D., and Bastien-Toniazzo, M. (1999). Expert error in trouble-shooting: an exploratory study in electronics. Int. J. Hum. Comput. Stud. 50, 391-405. doi: 10.1006/ijhc.1999.0251
16. Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). TheRationalImagination: HowPeople CreateAlternatives to Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT.
17. Cheng, P. W. (1997). From covariation to causation: a causal power theory. Psychol. Rev. 104, 367-405. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.104.2.367
18. Cheng, P. W. (2000). “Causal reasoning," in The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds R. Wilson and F. Keil (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 106-108.
19. Cheng, P. W., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., and Oliver, L. M. (1986). Pragmatic versus syntactic approaches to training deductive reasoning. Cogn. Psychol. 18, 293-328. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(86)90002-2
20. Cheng, P. W., and Novick, L. R. (1991). Causes versus enabling conditions. Cognition 40, 83-120. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(91)90047-8
21. Clark, H. H. (1975). “Bridging," in TheoreticalIssuesinNaturalLanguageProcessing, eds R. C. Schank and B. L. Nash-Webber (New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery), 169-174.
22. Craik, K. (1943). The Nature of Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23. De Houwer, J., and Beckers, T. (2002). A review of recent developments in research and theory on human contingency learning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 55B, 289-310. doi: 10.1080/02724990244000034
24. di Pellegrino, G., and Wise, S. P. (1991). A neurophysiological comparison of three distinct regions of the primate frontal lobe. Brain 114, 951-978. doi: 10.1093/brain/114.2.951
25. Duncan, J. (1986). Disorganization of behavior after frontal lobe damage. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 3, 271-290. doi: 10.1080/02643298608253360
26. Einhorn, H. J., and Hogarth, R. M. (1986). Judging probable cause. Psychol. Bull. 99, 3-19. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.99.1.3
27. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. Erkenntnis 14, 219-250. doi: 10.1007/BF00174894
28. Ferrier, D. (1876). The Functions of the Brain. London: Smith, Elder & Co. doi: 10.1037/12860-000
29. Frosch, C. A., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2011). Is everyday causation deterministic or probabilistic? Acta Psychol. 137, 280-291. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.01.015
30. Frosch, C. A., Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Cowley, M. (2007). “It’s not my fault, your Honor, I’m only the enabler,” in Proceedings of the 29th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, eds D. S. McNamara and J. G. Trafton (Austin, TX), 1755.
31. Fumero, A., Santamaria, C., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Reasoning and autobiographical memory for personality. Exp. Psychol. 57, 215-220. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000027
32. Funahashi, S., Bruce, C. J., and Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Mnemonic coding of visual space in the monkey’s dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 61, 331-349.
33. Fuster, J. M. (1973). Unit activity in prefrontal cortex during delayed-response performance: neuronal correlates of transient memory. J. Neurophysiol. 36, 61-78.
34. Fuster, J. M. (2008). The Prefrontal Cortex. Amsterdam; Boston: Academic Press/Elsevier.
35. Fuster, J. M., and Alexander, G. E. (1971). Neuron activity related to short-term memory. Science 173, 652-654. doi: 10.1126/science.173.3997.652
36. Geminiani, G. C., Carassa, A., and Bara, B. G. (1996). “Causality by contact," in Mental Models in Cognitive Science, eds J. Oakhill and A. Garnham (Hove; East Sussex: Psychology Press), 275-303.
37. Glymour, C. (2001). The Mind’s Arrows. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
38. Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1995). Architecture of the prefrontal cortex and the central executive. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 769, 71-83. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.1995.tb38132.x
39. Goldvarg, Y., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2001). Naive causality: a mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 25, 565-610. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2504_3
40. Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, D. E., Kushnir, T., and Danks, D. (2004). A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychol. Rev. 111, 1-31. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.1.3
41. Grafman, J. (1994). “Alternative frameworks for the conceptualization of prefrontal functions,” in Handbook of Neuropsychology, eds F. Boller and J. Grafman (Amsterdam: Elsevier), 187.
42. Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts, eds P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (New York, NY: Academic Press), 225-242.
43. Griffiths, T. L., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2005). Structure and strength in causal induction. Cogn. Psychol. 51, 354-384. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.05.004
44. Halsband, U., and Passingham, R. E. (1985). Premotor cortex and the conditions for movement in monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). Behav. Brain Res. 18, 269-277. doi: 10.1016/0166-4328(85)90035-X
45. Hattori, M., and Oaksford, M. (2007). Adaptive non-interventional heuristics for covariation detection in causal induction: model comparison and rational analysis. Cogn. Sci. 31, 765-814. doi: 10.1080/03640210701530755
46. Hilton, D. J., and Erb, H.-P. (1996). Mental models and causal explanation: judgements of probable cause and explanatory relevance. Think. Reason. 2, 273-308. doi: 10.1080/135467896394447
47. Hume, D. (1748/1988). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. LaSalle, IL: Open Court (Originally published 1748).
48. Jeffrey, R. (1981). Formal Logic: its Scope and Limits, 2nd Edn. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
49. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
50. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1988). “A taxonomy of thinking,” in The Psychology of Human Thought, eds R. J. Sternberg and E. E. Smith (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press), 429-457.
51. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1999). Causation, mental models, and the law. Brooklyn Law Rev. 65, 67-103.
52. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). How We Reason. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
53. Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Byrne, R. M. J. (1991). Deduction. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
54. Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Byrne, R. M. J. (2002). Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychol. Rev. 109, 646-678. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.109.4.646
55. Johnson-Laird, P. N., Girotto, V., and Legrenzi, P. (2004). Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency. Psychol. Rev. 111, 640-661. doi: 10.1037/0033- 295X.111.3.640
56. Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Hasson, U. (2003). Counterexamples in sentential reasoning. Mem. Cognit. 31, 1105-1113. doi: 10.3758/BF03196131
57. Johnson-Laird, P. N., and Khemlani, S. (2013). “Toward a unified theory of reasoning,” in The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 59, ed B. H. Ross (Elsevier, Inc.; Academic Press), 1-42. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-407187-2.00001-0
58. Kahneman, D., and Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternative. Psychol. Rev. 93, 75-88. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.93.2.136
59. Kant, I. (1781/1934). Critique of Pure Reason. Transl. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. New York, NY: Dutton. (Originally published 1781.)
60. Kelley, H. H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. Am. Psychol. 28, 107-128. doi: 10.1037/h0034225
61. Khemlani, S., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2011). The need to explain. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 64, 2276-2288. doi: 10.1080/17470218.2011.592593
62. Khemlani, S., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Hidden conflicts: explanations make incon- sistencies harder to detect. Acta Psychol. 139, 486-491. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.01.010
63. Khemlani, S., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2013). Cognitive changes from explanations. J. Cogn. Psychol. 25, 139-146. doi: 10.1080/20445911.2012.720968
64. Khemlani, S., Mackiewicz, R., Bucciarelli, M., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2013). Kinematic mental simulations in abduction and deduction. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 16766-16771. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1316275110
65. Khemlani, S., Orenes, I., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2012). Negation: a theory of its meaning, representation, and use. J. Cogn. Psychol. 24, 541-559. doi: 10.1080/20445911.2012.660913
66. Khemlani, S., Sussman, A., and Oppenheimer, D. (2011). Harry Potter and the sorcerer’s scope: scope biases in explanatory reasoning. Mem. Cognit. 39, 527-535. doi: 10.3758/s13421-010-0028-1
67. Knauff, M., Fangmeier, T., Ruff, C. C., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2003). Reasoning, models, and images: behavioral measures and cortical activity. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 4, 559-573. doi: 10.1162/089892903321662949
68. Koslowski, B. (1996). Theory and Evidence: theDevelopmentofScientific Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
69. Kroger, J. K., Nystrom, L. E., Cohen, J. D., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008). Distinct neural substrates for deductive and mathematical processing. Brain Res. 1243, 86-103. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2008.07.128
70. Kubota, K., and Niki, H. (1971). Prefrontal cortical unit activity and delayed alternation performance in monkeys. J. Neurophysiol. 34, 337-347.
71. Kuhnmunch, G., and Beller, S. (2005). Distinguishing between causes and enabling conditions - through mental models or linguistic cues? Cogn. Sci. 29, 1077-1090. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_39
72. Lee, N. Y. L., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2006). “Are there cross-cultural differences in reasoning?” in Proceedings ofthe 28th Annual Meeting ofthe Cognitive Science Society (Vancouver, BC: Cognitive Science Society), 459-464.
73. Legare, C. H. (2012). Exploring explanation: explaining inconsistent information guides hypothesis-testing behavior in young children. Child Dev. 83, 173-185. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01691.x
74. Leslie, S. J. (2008). Generics: cognition and acquisition. Philos. Rev. 117, 1-47. doi: 10.1215/00318108-2007-023
75. Lien, Y., and Cheng, P. (2000). Distinguishing genuine from spurious causes: a coherence hypothesis. Cogn. Psychol. 40, 87-137. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1999.0724
76. Lombrozo, T. (2007). Simplicity and probability in causal explanations. Cogn. Psychol. 55, 232-257. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.09.006
77. Lu, H., Yuille, A., Liljeholm, M., Cheng, P. W., and Holyoak, K. J. (2008). Bayesian generic priors for causal learning. Psychol. Rev. 115, 955-984. doi: 10.1037/a0013256
78. Mackie, J. L. (1980). The Cement of the Universe: a Study in Causation. Second 2nd Edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/0198246420.001.0001
79. Marr, D. (1982). Vision: a Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing ofVisual Information. New York, NY: Freeman.
80. Michalski, R. S., and Wojtusiak, J. (2007). “Generalizing data in natural language,” in Rough SetsandIntelligentSystemsParadigms, eds M. Kryszkiewicz, J. F. Peters, H. Rybinski, and A. Skowron (Berlin: Springer), 29-39.
81. Michotte, A. (1946/1963). The Perception of Causality. London: Methuen. (Originally published 1946.)
82. Mill, J. S. (1874). A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Evidence. 8th Edn. New York, NY: Harper. (First edition published 1843.)
83. Miller, E. K., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167-202. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167
84. Miller, G. A., and Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. doi: 10.4159/harvard.97806744 21288
85. Miyake, N. (1986). Constructive interaction and the iterative process of understanding. Cogn. Sci. 10, 151-177. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog1002_2
86. Morris, M. W., and Nisbett, R. E. (1993). “Tools of the trade: deductive schemas taught in psychology and philosophy,” in Rules for Reasoning, ed R. E. Nisbett (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 228-256.
87. Murray, E. A., Bussey, T. J., and Wise, S. P. (2000). Role of prefrontal cortex in a network for arbitrary visuomotor mapping. Exp. Brain Res. 133, 114-129. doi: 10.1007/s002210000406
88. Oaksford, M., and Chater, N. (2007). Bayesian Rationality: the Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198524496.001.0001
89. Passingham, R. E. (1993). The Frontal Lobes and Voluntary Action. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
90. Patterson, R., and Barbey, A. K. (2012). “A cognitive neuroscience framework for causal reasoning,” in The Neural Representation of BeliefSystems, eds J. Grafman and F. Krueger (New York, NY: Psychology Press), 76-120.
91. Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
92. Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
93. Perales, J. C., and Shanks, D. R. (2007). Models of covariation-based causal judgment: a review and synthesis. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14, 577-596. doi: 10.3758/BF03196807
94. Petrides, M. (1982). Motor conditional associative-learning after selective pre- frontal lesions in the monkey. Behav. Brain Res. 5, 407-413. doi: 10.1016/0166-4328(82)90044-4
95. Petrides, M. (1985). Deficits in non-spatial conditional associative learning after periarcuate lesions in the monkey. Behav. Brain Res. 16, 95-101. doi: 10.1016/0166-4328(85)90085-3
96. Petrides, M., Tomaiuolo, F., Yeterian, E. H., and Pandya, D. N. (2012). The prefrontal cortex: comparative architectonic organization in the human and the macaque monkey brains. Cortex 48, 46-57. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2011.07.002
97. Polya, G. (1973). How to Solve it: a New Aspect of Mathematical Methods. 2nd Edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Originally published 1945.)
98. Prasada, S., Khemlani, S., Leslie, S.-J., and Glucksberg, S. (2013). Conceptual distinctions amongst generics. Cognition 126, 405-422. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.010
99. Ramnani, N., and Owen, A. M. (2004). Anterior prefrontal cortex: insights into function from anatomy and neuroimaging. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 5, 184-194. doi: 10.1038/nrn1343
100. Ramoni, M. F., Stefanelli, M., Magnani, L., and Barosi, G. (1992). An epistemo- logical framework for medical knowledge based system. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. 22, 1361-1375. doi: 10.1109/21.199462
101. Rehder, B. (2003). Categorization as causal reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 27, 709-748. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2705_2
102. Reichenbach, H. (1956). The Direction of Time. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
103. Rips, L. J. (1994). ThePsychology ofProof. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
104. Russell, B. A. W. (1912-1913). On the notion of cause. Proc. Arist. Soc. 13, 1-26.
105. Salmon, W. C. (1980). Probabilistic causality. Pac. Philos. Q. 61, 50-74.
106. Salsburg, D. (2001). The Lady Tasting Tea: How Statistics Revolutionized Science in the Twentieth Century. New York, NY: W.H. Freeman.
107. Satpute, A. B., Fenker, D. B., Waldmann, M. R., Tabibnia, G., Holyoak, K. J., and Lieberman, M. D. (2005). An fMRI study of causal judgments. Eur. J. Neurosci. 22, 1233-1238. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2005.04292.x
108. Schlottman, A., and Shanks, D. R. (1992). Evidence for a distinction between judged and perceived causality. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Exp. Psychol. 44, 321-342. doi: 10.1080/02724989243000055
109. Shallice, T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Biol. Sci. 298, 199-209. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1982.0082
110. Shanks, D. R. (1995). The Psychology of Associative Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511623288
111. Sloman, S. A. (2005). Causal Models: How We Think About the World and its Alternatives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001
112. Sloman, S. A., Barbey, A. K., and Hotaling, J. (2009). A causal model theory of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent. Cogn. Sci. 33, 21-50 doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2008.01002.x
113. Sloman, S. A., and Lagnado, D. A. (2005). Do we ‘do’? Cogn. Sci. 29, 5-39. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2901_2
114. Suppes, P. (1970). AProbabilistic Theory ofCausality. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
115. Tenenbaum, J. B., and Griffiths, T. L. (2001). “Structure learning in human causal induction,” in Advances in NeuralInformation Processing Systems13, eds T. Leen, T. Dietterich, and V. Tresp (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 59-65.
116. Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L., and Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 309-318. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.05.009
117. Tettamanti, M., Manenti, R., Della Rosa, P. A., Falini, A., Perani, D., Cappa, S. F., et al. (2008). Negation in the brain: modulating action representations. Neuroimage 43, 358-367. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.08.004
118. Turnbull, W., and Slugoski, B. R. (1988). “Conversational and linguistic processes in causal attribution,” in Contemporary Science and Natural Explanation: Commonsense Conceptions of Causality, ed D. Hilton (Brighton; Sussex: Harvester Press), 66-93.
119. von Wright, G. H. (1973). “On the logic and epistemology of the causal relation,” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, IV, ed P. Suppes (Amsterdam: North-Holland), 293-312.
120. Waldmann, M. R., Holyoak, K. J., and Fratianne, A. (1995). Causal models and the acquisition of category structure. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 124, 181-206. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.124.2.181
121. Watanabe, M. (1990). Prefrontal unit activity during associative learning in the monkey. Exp. Brain Res. 80, 296-309. doi: 10.1007/BF00228157
122. Watanabe, M. (1992). Frontal units of the monkey coding the associative significance of visual and auditory stimuli. Exp. Brain Res. 89, 233-247. doi: 10.1007/BF00228241
123. White, P. A. (1995). Use of prior beliefs in the assignment of causal roles: causal powers versus regularity-based accounts. Mem. Cognit. 23, 243-254. doi: 10.3758/BF03197225
124. White, P. A. (1999). Toward a causal realist account of causal understanding. Am. J. Psychol. 112, 605-642. doi: 10.2307/1423653
125. White, P. A. (2014). Singular cues to causality and their use in human causal judgment. Cogn. Sci. 38, 38-75. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12075
126. Wise, S. P. (1996). The frontal-basal ganglia system in primates. Crit. Rev. Neurobiol. 10, 317-356. doi: 10.1615/CritRevNeurobiol.v10.i3-4.30
127. Wolff, P. (2007). Representing causation. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 136, 82-111. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.136.1.82
128. Wolff, P., and Song, G. (2003). Models of causation and causal verbs. Cogn. Psychol. 47, 276-332. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0285(03)00036-7
129. Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: a Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.