"If only" counterfactual thoughts about exceptional actions

Memory and Cognition

Volumn 39, Issue 7, 2011, Pages 1317-1331

  Dixon, James E ^a   Byrne, Ruth M J ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

Creativity; Decision making; Judgment; Reasoning; Social cognition

Indexed keywords

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; HUMAN; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING; PHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; THINKING;

ADOLESCENT; ADULT; AGED; DECISION MAKING; FEMALE; GAMBLING; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MALE; MIDDLE AGED; THINKING; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84856428646     PISSN: 0090502X     EISSN: 15325946     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3758/s13421-011-0101-4     Document Type: Article

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