Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 267-283

  Evans, Jonathan St B T ^a   Over, David E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

^b DURHAM UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief; New paradigm; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887933386     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2012.745450     Document Type: Article

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