Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 453-470

  Elqayam, Shira ^a   Evans, Jonathan St B T ^b  

^a DE MONTFORT UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bayesianism; New paradigm; Rationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888009294     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.834268     Document Type: Article

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