Dual processes and mental models in the development of conditional reasoning

The Development of Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 95-121

  Barrouillet, Pierre ^a   Gauffroy, Caroline ^a  

^a Groupe Méthodologie et Analyse de Données Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences de l'éducation   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917169706     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203068748     Document Type: Chapter

References (56)

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