Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 269-295

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Chater, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Conditionals; Local vs. global computation; Minimal models; Non monotonic reasoning; Probabilities

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894354781     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.877401     Document Type: Article

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