Direct evidence for a dual process model of deductive inference

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 1213-1222

  Markovits, Henry ^a   Brunet, Marie Laurence ^a   Thompson, Valerie ^b   Brisson, Janie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

Author keywords

Conditional reasoning; Dual process theories; Mental models; Metacognition; Probabilistic reasoning

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMAN; LEARNING; MALE; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; REACTION TIME; TIME; YOUNG ADULT;

ADULT; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; PROBABILITY LEARNING; PROBLEM SOLVING; REACTION TIME; TIME FACTORS; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84880689234     PISSN: 02787393     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0030906     Document Type: Article

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