Is the Basic Conditional Probabilistic?

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Volumn 143, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 1214-1241

  Goodwin, Geoffrey P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional meaning; Conditional probability; Conditional reasoning; Conditionals; Pragmatics

Indexed keywords

ADULT; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; LOGIC; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; YOUNG ADULT;

ADULT; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; LOGIC; PROBABILITY; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84901481777     PISSN: 00963445     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/a0034232     Document Type: Article

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