The need to explain

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

Volumn 64, Issue 11, 2011, Pages 2276-2288

  Khemlani, Sangeet S ^a   Johnson Laird, Philip N ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief revision; Explanations; Inconsistency; Minimalism; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855782499     PISSN: 17470218     EISSN: 17470226     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2011.592593     Document Type: Article

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