The psychology of moral reasoning

Judgment and Decision Making

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 121-139

  Bucciarelli, Monica ^a   Khemlani, Sangeet ^b   Johnson Laird, P N ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Deontic reasoning; Inferences; Intuitions; Moral dilemmas; Moral reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349917831     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19302975     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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