The mental representation of causal conditional reasoning: Mental models or causal models

Cognition

Volumn 119, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 403-418

  Ali, Nilufa ^a   Chater, Nick ^b   Oaksford, Mike ^c  

^a ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Augmenting; Bayesian Networks; Causal models; Conditional inference; Discounting; Mental models

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION; CAUSAL CONDITIONAL REASONING; CAUSAL MODELING; COGNITION; CONDITIONING; CONTROLLED STUDY; LOGIC; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

BAYES THEOREM; CAUSALITY; COGNITION; FEMALE; HUMANS; MALE; MENTAL PROCESSES; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MODELS, STATISTICAL; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 79953295329     PISSN: 00100277     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.02.005     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. Ali N., Schlottmann A., Shaw C., Chater N., Oaksford M. Conditionals and causal discounting in children. Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking 2010, 117-134. Oxford University Press, Oxford. M. Oaksford, N. Chater (Eds.).
2. Barwise J., Perry J. Situations and attitudes 1983, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
3. Braine M., O'Brien D. Mental logic 1998, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, Mahwah, NJ, US.
4. Byrne R.M.J. Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition 1989, 31:61-83.
5. Byrne R.M.J., Espino O., Santamaria C. Counterexamples and the suppression of inferences. Journal of Memory and Language 1999, 40:347-373.
6. Carnap R. The logical foundations of probability theory 1950, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1962 ed.
7. Chater N., Oaksford M. Mental mechanisms: Speculations on human causal learning and reasoning. Information sampling and adaptive cognition 2006, 210-236. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, US. P. Juslin, K. Fiedler (Eds.).
8. Corner A., Hahn U., Oaksford M. The psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument. Journal of Memory and Language 2011, 64:133-152.
9. Cummins D.D. Naïve theories and causal deduction. Memory and Cognition 1995, 23:646-658.
10. Cummins D.D., Lubart T., Alksnis O., Rist R. Conditional reasoning and causation. Memory and Cognition 1991, 19:274-282.
11. De Neys W.D. Counterexample retrieval and inhibition during conditional reasoning: Direct evidence from memory probing. Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking 2010, 197-206. Oxford University Press, Oxford. M. Oaksford, N. Chater (Eds.).
12. De Neys W.D., Schaeken W., d'Ydewalle G. Causal conditional reasoning and strength of association: The disabling condition case. The European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 2003, 15:161-176.
13. De Neys W.D., Schaeken W., d'Ydewalle G. Inference suppression and semantic memory retrieval: Every counterexample counts. Memory and Cognition 2003, 31:581-595.
14. De Neys W., Vartanian O., Goel V. Smarter than we think: When our brains detect that we are biased. Psychological Science 2008, 19:483-489.
15. Evans J.St.B.T. Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and judgement 2007, Psychology Press, New York, NY, US.
16. Evans J.St.B.T., Handley S., Bacon A. Reasoning under time pressure: A study of causal conditional inference. Experimental Psychology 2009, 56:77-83.
17. Evans J.St.B.T., Handley S., Hadjchristidis C., Thompson V., Over D., Bennett S. On the basis of belief in causal and diagnostic conditionals. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 2007, 60(5):635-643.
18. Evans J.St.B.T., Neilens H., Handley S., Over D. When can we say 'if'?. Cognition 2008, 108:100-116.
19. Evans J.St.B.T., Over D.E. If 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
20. Computation, causation and discovery 1999, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. C. Glymour, G. Cooper (Eds.).
21. Geiger S.M., Oberauer K. Reasoning with conditionals: Does every counterexample count? It's frequency that counts. Memory and Cognition 2007, 35:2060-2074.
22. Goldvarg E., Johnson-Laird P.N. Naive causality: A mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cognitive Science 2001, 25:565-610.
23. Grice H.P. Logic and conversation. Syntax and semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts 1975, 41-58. Academic Press, New York, NY. P. Cole, J. Morgan (Eds.).
24. Griffiths T., Tenenbaum J. Structure and strength in causal induction. Cognitive Psychology 2005, 51:334-384.
25. Johnson-Laird P.N. Mental modes 1983, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
26. Johnson-Laird P.N. Conditionals and mental models. On conditionals 1986, 55-75. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. C. Ferguson, J. Reilly, A. ter Meulen, E.C. Traugott (Eds.).
27. Johnson-Laird P.N., Byrne R.M.J. Deduction 1991, Lawrence Erlbaum Press, Hillsdale, NJ.
28. Johnson-Laird P.N., Legrenzi P., Girotto V., Legrenzi M.S., Caverni J.P. Naïve probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review 1999, 106:62-88.
29. Kelley H.H. Attribution in social interaction 1971, General Learning Press, New York.
30. Kelley H.H. The processes of causal attribution. American Psychologist 1973, 28:107-128.
31. Kowalski R. Reasoning with conditionals in artificial intelligence. Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking 2010, 253-282. Oxford University Press, Oxford. M. Oaksford, N. Chater (Eds.).
32. Markovits H., Potvin F. Suppression of valid inferences and knowledge structures: The curious effect of producing alternative antecedents on reasoning with causal conditionals. Memory and Cognition 2001, 29:736-744.
33. Markovits H., Quinn S. Efficiency of retrieval correlates with " logical" reasoning from causal conditional premises. Memory and Cognition 2002, 30:696-706.
34. Morris M.W., Larrick R.P. When one cause casts doubt on another: A normative analysis of discounting in causal attribution. Psychological Review 1995, 102:331-355.
35. Oaksford, M. (1989). Cognition and inquiry: The pragmatics of conditional reasoning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh.
36. Oaksford M., Chater N. Probabilities and pragmatics in conditional inference. Suppression and order effects. Thinking: Psychological perspectives on reasoning, judgment and decision making 2003, 95-122. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester, UK. D. Hardman, L. Macchi (Eds.).
37. Oaksford M., Chater N. Bayesian rationality 2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
38. Oaksford M., Chater N. Probability logic and the Modus Ponens-Modus Tollens asymmetry in conditional inference. The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive science 2008, 97-120. Oxford University Press, Oxford. N. Chater, M. Oaksford (Eds.).
39. Oaksford M., Chater N. Causation and conditionals in the cognitive science of human reasoning. Open Psychology Journal 2010, 3:105-118.
40. Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking 2010, Oxford University Press, Oxford. M. Oaksford, N. Chater (Eds.).
41. Oaksford M., Chater N. Conditionals and constraint satisfaction: Reconciling mental models and the probabilistic approach?. Cognition and conditionals: Probability and logic in human thinking 2010, 309-334. Oxford University Press, Oxford. M. Oaksford, N. Chater (Eds.).
42. Oaksford M., Chater N., Larkin J. Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 2000, 26:883-889.
43. Over D. New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 2009, 15:431-438.
44. Over D., Hadjichristidis C., Evans J.St.B.T., Handley S., Sloman S. The probability of causal conditionals. Cognitive Psychology 2007, 54:62-97.
45. Pearl J. Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems 1988, Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo.
46. Pearl J. Causality: Models, reasoning and inference 2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
47. Perham N.R., Oaksford M. Deontic reasoning with emotional content: Evolutionary psychology or decision theory?. Cognitive Science 2005, 29:681-718.
48. Rips L. The psychology of proof: Deductive reasoning in human thinking 1994, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, US.
49. Salmon W. Theoretical explanation. Explanation 1975, 118-145. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. S. Korner (Ed.).
50. Simoneau M., Markovits H. Reasoning with premises that are not empirically true: Evidence for the role of inhibition and retrieval. Developmental Psychology 2003, 39:964-975.
51. Sloman S. Causal models: How people think about the world and its alternatives 2005, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, US.
52. Sloman S., Barbey A., Hotaling J. A causal model theory of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent. Cognitive Science 2009, 33:21-50.
53. Sloman S., Lagnado D. Do we 'do'?. Cognitive Science 2005, 29:5-39.
54. Sober E. Common cause explanation. Philosophy of Science 1984, 51:212-241.
55. Walsh C., Sloman S.A. Updating beliefs with causal models: Violations of screening off. Memory and mind: A festschrift for Gordon H. Bower 2008, 345-357. Lawrence Erlbaum, New Jersey. M.A. Gluck, J.R. Anderson, S.M. Kosslyn (Eds.).
56. Wolff P. Representing causation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 2007, 136:82-111.
57. Wolff P., Barbey A., Hausknecht M. For want of a nail: How absences cause events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 2010, 139(2):191-221.