Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 19, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 346-379

  Oaksford, Mike ^a   Chater, Nick ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Causal Bayes nets; Conditionals; Dynamic inference; Everyday reasoning; Learning; New paradigm

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888006313     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.808163     Document Type: Article

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