Naive Probability: Model-Based Estimates of Unique Events

Cognitive Science

Volumn 39, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 1216-1258

  Khemlani, Sangeet S ^a   Lotstein, Max ^b   Johnson Laird, Philip N ^c,d  

^a NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesianism; Frequentism; Mental models; Subjective probabilities

Indexed keywords

BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN; PHYSIOLOGY; PROBABILITY; THEORETICAL MODEL; UNCERTAINTY;

BAYES THEOREM; HUMANS; JUDGMENT; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PROBABILITY; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 84937696376     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: 15516709     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12193     Document Type: Article

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