Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 1-16

  Hlobil, Ulf ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84958255768     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-015-0230-y     Document Type: Article

References (37)

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