Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 245-268

  Gubbins, Eoin ^a   Byrne, Ruth M J ^a  

^a TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN   (Ireland)

Author keywords

Dual processes; Emotions; Inferences; Moral dilemmas; Moral reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894323255     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.877400     Document Type: Article

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