Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency

Psychological Review

Volumn 111, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 640-661

  Johnson Laird, P N ^a   Girotto, Vittorio ^b,c   Legrenzi, Paolo ^c  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CNRS   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042777658     PISSN: 0033295X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.111.3.640     Document Type: Review

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