Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications

Thinking and Reasoning

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 169-187

  De Neys, Wim ^a,b,c  

^a CNRS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS DESCARTES   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Conflict detection; Dual processes; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894298183     PISSN: 13546783     EISSN: 14640708     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13546783.2013.854725     Document Type: Article

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