Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting

10th International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, ISAIM 2008

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; RESEARCH ISSUES; TWO DOMAINS;

COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

RESEARCH;

EID: 58649109282     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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