Algorithmic Mechanism Design

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 35, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 166-196

  Nisan, Noam ^a,b   Ronen, Amir ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000421874     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0790     Document Type: Article

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