Common voting rules as maximum likelihood estimators

Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, UAI 2005

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 145-152

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

GENERAL METHOD; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE; MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATOR; NOISE MODELING; PREFERENCE AGGREGATIONS; VOTING RULES;

MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION;

EID: 33750682154     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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