Communication complexity of common voting rules

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 78-87

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication Complexity; Voting

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; PUBLIC POLICY; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; VOTING; VOTING RULES;

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

EID: 30044446562     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1064009.1064018     Document Type: Conference Paper

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