Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes

Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 279-288

  Xia, Lirong ^a   Lang, Jérôme ^b   Ying, Mingsheng ^a  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PAUL SABATIER   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONDITIONAL PREFERENCES; LINEAR ORDER; MULTIPLE ELECTIONS; SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITIONS; SEQUENTIAL RULE; SEQUENTIAL VOTING; SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS; VOTING RULES;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 78649504414     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1324249.1324286     Document Type: Conference Paper

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