Strategic voting when aggregating partially ordered preferences

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 685-687

  Pini, M S ^a   Rossi, F ^a   Venable, K B ^a   Walsh, T ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADOVA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Gibbard satterthwaite theorem; Partial orders; Preference aggregation; Strategy proofness

Indexed keywords

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; DATA REDUCTION; DATA STRUCTURES; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; PROBLEM SOLVING;

GIBBARD SATTERTHWAITE THEOREMS; PARTIAL ORDERS; PREFERENCE AGGREGATION; STRATEGY PROOFNESS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 34247282763     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160755     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (7)

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3. A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41, 1973.
4. K. Konczak and J. Lang. Voting procedures with incomplete preferences. IJCAI 05 Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling, 2005.
5. E. Muller and M. A. Satterthwaite. The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness. Economic Theory, 14, 1977.
6. M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, T. Walsh. Aggregating partially ordered preferences: impossibility and possibility results. Proc. TARK X, ACM Digital Library, June 2005.
7. M. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10:187-217, 1975.